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SOFT LAW:
LESSONS FROM CONGRESSIONAL
PRACTICE
Jacob E. Gersen* & Eric A. Posner**
Soft law consists of rules issued by lawmaking bodies that do not comply
with procedural formalities necessary to give the rules legal status yet
nonetheless influence the behavior of other lawmaking bodies and of the public.
Soft law has been much discussed in the literatures on international law,
constitutional law, and administrative law, yet congressional soft-lawmaking,
such as the congressional resolution, has received little attention. Congressional
soft law affects behavior by informing the public and political institutions about
the intentions and policy preferences of Congress, which are informative about
future hard law as well as of Congress's view of the world, and thus relevant to
the decision making of various political agents as well as that of the public.
Congressional soft law is important for a range of topics, including statutory
interpretation and constitutional development. Other types of soft law-
international, constitutional, andjudicial-are compared.
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INTRODUCTION
Soft law has taken the legal academy by storm. In constitutional law, a
deluge of recent scholarship argues that the "small c" constitution of unwritten
legal norms deserves as much attention as the "big C" written Constitution. I
Scholars have devoted increasing attention to "the constitution outside the
constitution"--extraconstitutional or subconstitutional norms, especially those
developed by nonjudicial agents such as legislatures.
1. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215 (2001); Sanford Levinson
& Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crises, 157 U. PA. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1267979 (examining the relationship
between constitutional crises and constitutional development); Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 991 (2008) (discussing the way
confrontations between branches generate constitutional development); Mark Tushnet,
Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 523 (2004) (distinguishing constitutional
and preconstitutional understandings); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the
Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 (2007); Jon Elster, Unwritten Constitutional Norms (2007)
(unpublished manuscript) (describing binding constitutional norms that do not appear in the
written constitution). The idea is not new. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an
Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975).
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In international law, too, scholars have turned their attention from the
traditional manifestations of international law-treaties, judicial opinions,
government announcements-to what they have also called soft law. 2 Soft
international law includes nonbinding declarations such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and General Assembly resolutions. Despite their
lack of formal legal status, these materials can ultimately have real effect-by
working their way into customary international law or by providing the
framework for informal interstate cooperation. 3 Soft law in international
relations, like small-c constitutional law, consists of norms that affect the
behavior of agents, even though the norms do not have the status of formal law.
Or consider the recent controversy about presidential signing statements.
4
When Congress presents a bill to the President for signature, the President
sometimes issues a signing statement that interprets some of the bill's
provisions. 5 Signing statements are not binding law, but many people believe
that they do, or should, influence courts and agencies when these bodies
interpret statutes. If signing statements affect the beliefs of private parties about
how the President will execute the law, signing statements might affect private
behavior. Thus, signing statements, although lacking formal legal power, could
have an effect similar to that of the other forms of soft law.
2. See, e.g., COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) (studying cases
of compliance with nonlegal norms); JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 91-100 (2005) (discussing differences in domestic effects of the two
types of law); ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT
THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 110-20 (2006) (arguing that soft-
law-style informal cooperation sometimes is possible when formal agreements are not);
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54
INT'L ORG. 421 (2000) (providing a typology and general analysis); Daniel E. Ho,
Compliance and International Soft Law. Why Do Countries Implement the Basle Accord, 5
J. INT'L ECON. L. 647 (2002) (providing empirical evidence that many states, especially
democracies, comply with the Basle Accord, even though this instrument is not legally
binding); Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 INT'L ORG.
495 (1991) (arguing that informal agreements can be negotiated more quickly, are more
flexible, require less information, and can avoid publicity, but provide less of a commitment,
than legal agreements).
3. See Ho, supra note 2 (providing empirical evidence for the Basle Accords).
4. See Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and
Executive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307 (2006); Christopher N. May, Presidential
Defiance of "Unconstitutional" Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 865 (1994); William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential Legislative History: A
Critique, 66 IND. L.J. 699 (1991); Kristy L. Carroll, Comment, Whose Statute Is It Anyway?:
Why and How Courts Should Use Presidential Signing Statements When Interpreting
Federal Statutes, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 475 (1997); see also PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF
THE PRESIDENT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE DIRECT ACTION 199-230 (2002).
5. Neil J. Kinkopf & Peter M. Shane, Signed Under Protest: A Database of
Presidential Signing Statements, 2001-2006 (Ohio State Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 106,
2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1022202 (assembling collection of presidential
signing statements).
SOFT LA W
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The controversy about signing statements mirrors an older dispute about
other soft-law practices in the executive branch. Agencies issue statements of
"best practices" and policy manuals that may induce voluntary compliance by
regulated parties. 6 Critics complain that administrative agencies produce too
much policy through informal and nonbinding guidance documents and policy
statements in order to avoid costs associated with formal mechanisms like
notice and comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. 7 For example, if a
statute requires that wild animals be contained by fences that are "structurally
sound,"8 an agency might use notice and comment proceedings to issue a
formal rule interpreting the phrase "structurally sound" to require a fence taller
than eight feet. Alternatively, the agency might issue a guidance document
stating that the agency understands the statute to so require and pronouncing
that the agency intends to enforce the statute only against owners with fences
less than eight feet high. This statement has no formal legal force; the agency
must still defend its interpretation of the statute in an enforcement proceeding
or litigation. Nonetheless, many regulated parties will simply construct a fence
to comply.
To the private-law scholar, soft law might not seem as exotic as it does in
these other fields. A judicial opinion contains a holding that has binding legal
effect and reasoning that, in the case of some higher courts, might also have
binding effect. But generally speaking, the reasoning in judicial opinions is
only "dicta": it does not have binding force. And yet clearly dicta have a great
deal of importance, influencing the decision making of subsequent courts 9 and
hence people who bring their behavior in line with predictions of how courts
will act.
As a final example, also from private law, consider the ubiquitous presence
of nonbinding instruments in commercial relations. A letter of intent, for
example, signals that two parties have an interest in further negotiations leading
up to a binding contract but rarely has legal force itself. 10 It is clear that such
"soft contracts" have commercial importance and affect the behavior of the
parties that enter them. 1
1
6. See David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 307-13 (2006) (discussing
trend towards best practices in agency actions in past decade).
7. See generally John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893,
914-17 (2004) (discussing doctrine governing what type of rules must be issued using
procedural formality); Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DuKE L.J. 1463,
1480-81 (1992) (discussing tradeoffs entailed in enhanced procedural formality in
rulemaking).
8. See Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705 (2007)
(discussing Hoctor v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 82 F.3d 165 (7th Cir. 1996)).
9. Cf Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Matthew Stephenson, Informative Precedent and
Intrajudicial Communication, 96 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 755 (2002).
10. See, e.g., Empro Mfg. Co. v. Ball-Co Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 423, 426 (7th Cir. 1989).
11. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
[Vol. 61:573
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The academic literatures on these topics have different concerns, yet the
themes are similar. Soft law refers to statements by lawmaking authorities that
do not have the force of law (most often because they do not comply with
relevant formalities or for other reasons are not regarded as legally binding' 2 ),
but nonetheless affect the behavior of others either (1) because others take the
statements as credible expressions of policy judgments or intentions that, at
some later point, might be embodied in formally binding law and reflected in
the coercive actions of executive agents, or (2) because the statements provide
epistemic guidance about how the authorities see the world. 13 Individuals,
governments, states, and other agents use soft law in order to enter
commitments and influence behavior where legal mechanisms are regarded as
undesirable.
Against this backdrop, it is a puzzle that no parallel literature has emerged
in the field of legislation and legislative process. 14 One does not have to look
hard to find a similar form of soft law: the congressional resolution.
Congressional resolutions-whether concurrent or one-house-generally have
no formal legal effect. 15 Periodically, proposals surface to pay more attention
to the resolution as a mechanism for influencing statutory interpretation,
16
foreign policy, 17 or some other external matter. Yet the soft statute has
12. With this qualification, we hope to avoid taking a position in the debate between
positivists and their critics, who disagree about whether formalities mark the border between
law and nonlegal statements.
13. The final example, involving private contracting, does not involve lawmaking
authorities except in the metaphorical but usefully analogous sense that private parties can
make "law" for themselves by entering contracts. Cf H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
(2d ed. 1997).
14. The closest work is on the "expressive functions" of law, which focuses on the
communicative impact of hard law. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS
(2000); Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of
Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1577, 1598 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and
Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 595 (1998); Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H.
McAdams, The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of
Informative Law, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 1 (2003) (formal law serves expressive functions,
revealing information about legislative information); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point
Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REv. 1649, 1652 (2000) (arguing law can provide a
resolution to coordination problems by specifying a focal point); Cass R. Sunstein, On the
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021, 2029-31 (1996). For an overview, see
Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
1363 (2000).
15. There are familiar exceptions. Consider, for example, the Senate's approval of
treaties, the approval of proposed constitutional amendments, and the decision to impeach by
the House.
16. Rankin M. Gibson, Congressional Concurrent Resolutions: An Aid Statutory
Interpretation?, 37 A.B.A. J. 421 (1951).
17. See, e.g., Doyle W. Buckwalter, The Congressional Concurrent Resolution: A
Search for Foreign Policy Influence, 14 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 434, 442-44 (1970) (arguing
that the concurrent resolution is often used by Congress to attempt to influence foreign
policy).
SOFT LA W
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received little attention in scholarly work on legislation. 18 The conventional
wisdom is that such measures lack importance because they do not create
binding legal obligations. 19 They are cheap and often happy talk by
legislatures, commending military officers for good service or sports teams for
winning championships.
In fact, many congressional resolutions are very serious: they assert
controversial foreign policy judgments, urge the President to intervene in
humanitarian crises or to avoid a military conflict, criticize allies and enemies,
forecast plans for taxation and regulation, send signals to regulatory agencies
about Congress's expectations, criticize the President's interpretations of
executive power, advance interpretations of constitutional provisions and
statutes, encourage state and local governments to address policy problems,
identify public health threats that need funding, and much more. Statutory
soft law deserves more attention than it has received, especially in light of the
large cognate literatures that examine the workings of soft law in other fields.
In the course of analyzing congressional resolutions and other forms of
legislative soft law-including hortatory statutes-we advance a general theory
that explains the attractiveness of soft law, its advantages and disadvantages,
and its place in our constitutional order. We show that soft public law is
preferable to hard public law in identifiable cases and contexts.
The congressional resolution is essentially a "soft statute"-a device for
communicating the policy views and intentions of one or both houses of
Congress. Legislative soft law communicates congressional intentions more
accurately and cheaply than does a regular statute, which will usually reflect
the views of the President as well. Legislative soft law communicates the views
of a chamber or the Congress more accurately than do statements of individual
legislators, whose views will often diverge from that of the majority.
These communications can influence the behavior of the public and of
other political institutions through three main mechanisms. First, a
congressional communication affects people's beliefs about how Congress will
(formally) regulate in the future, to the extent that it credibly reveals the
political preferences of Congress (or its members or a substantial coalition of
its members or its leadership, etc.). A soft statute thus anticipates a hard statute,
18. But see GABRIELE GANZ, QUASI-LEGISLATION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
SECONDARY LEGISLATION (1987). Ganz surveys the use of extrastatutory codes of practice,
circulars, and guidelines in the United Kingdom. She argues that quasi legislation can be an
effective way of regulating behavior when there is already consensus; it plays a coordination
role. Although Ganz has a somewhat different set of nonstatutory laws in mind, she draws a
parallel distinction between quasi legislation aimed at private parties and quasi legislation
aimed at other public entities that we develop here. Our theoretical apparatus differs in that
we emphasize the informational effects of soft statutes or, in her terms, nonstatutes.
19. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 756 (1986) ("A concurrent resolution,
in contrast, makes no binding policy; it is a means of expressing fact, principles, opinions,
and purposes of the two Houses .... (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
20. We discuss examples infra Part I.B.
[Vol. 61:573
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but when the target audience reacts appropriately to the soft statute, the hard
statute may become unnecessary. Second, a congressional communication may
have a purely epistemic effect. Information about Congress's views might
cause people to change their beliefs about the state of the world. 2 1 Third, in
some settings other institutions that generate formal law take legislative views
as an input. Agencies, courts, and the President regularly incorporate legislative
views as one of many factors in the construction of binding policy.
Part I defines soft law and distinguishes it from related concepts. Part II
explains how legislative soft law affects behavior. Part III discusses
applications of the theory to the public, the President, and administrative
agencies. Part IV discusses the implications of the theory for courts, focusing
on statutory interpretation and constitutional adjudication. Part V offers a
general theory of soft law, linking our analysis of soft statutes with soft
constitutional law, soft international law, and other fields. We hope to stimulate
thinking about the role of informal or nonlegal behavior in lawmaking
institutions-a public-law analogue to the private-law-focused literature on law
and social norms.
22
I. SOFT LAW IN LEGISLATURES
We define soft law as a rule issued by a lawmaking authority that does not
comply with constitutional and other formalities or understandings23 that are
necessary for the rule to be legally binding. We define hard law as a rule issued
by a lawmaking authority that does comply with constitutional and other
formalities or understandings that are necessary for the rule to be legally
binding. The lawmaking body uses soft law because the hard-law approach has
disadvantages. Sometimes, but not always, soft law will produce the same
behavioral effects that an otherwise equivalent hard law would have produced;
at other times, soft law might have more desirable consequences than the
nearest hard-law equivalent would.
A. Hard Statutes
Article I, section 7 of the U.S. Constitution requires that a bill be approved
by both houses of Congress (bicameralism) and signed by the President(presentment).24 The Supreme Court has rejected many schemes that deviate
from this "'finely wrought' procedure." 25  However, congressional
21. Cf Dharmapala & McAdams, supra note 14 (discussing expressive effects of hard
law).
22. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).
23. See supra note 12.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
25. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 440 (1998) (line item veto)
SOFT LA W
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pronouncements can become the law of the land in other ways as well. Treaties
are approved by two-thirds of the Senate. 26 Bills vetoed by the President
nonetheless become law if approved by two-thirds of the House and the
Senate. 27 In these latter cases, however, the law still satisfies the relevant
procedural requirements. In most cases, compliance with these formalities
distinguishes hard statutes from soft statutes. However, we will discuss some
ambiguous cases below.
B. Soft Statutes
Soft statutes do not meet the formal requirements for duly enacted
legislation, but nonetheless may affect behavior. Two prime examples of soft
legislation, and the ones on which we focus, are the simple resolution and the
concurrent resolution. 28 A simple resolution is a resolution passed by a
majority of one house of Congress. 29 Concurrent resolutions are approved by
majorities of both houses of Congress. 30 Resolutions are used for a remarkably
varied assortment of activities. A nonexclusive list from recent Congresses
includes: (1) foreign policy judgments (for example, urging the European
Union to maintain an arms embargo on China,3 1 and calling on the President to
recognize the Armenian genocide 32 ); (2) urging revision of administrative
regulations (such as those affecting industrial truck operator training, 33 labeling
of clothing, 34 and the distribution of resources held for disaster relief 35); (3)
("What has emerged in these cases from the President's exercise of his statutory cancellation
powers, however, are truncated versions of two bills that passed both Houses of Congress.
They are not the product of the 'finely wrought' procedure that the Framers designed."); INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (legislative veto) ("It emerges clearly that the
prescription for legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7 represents the Framers' decision that the
legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.").
26. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
27. Id. art. I, § 7.
28. As distinguished from the joint resolution, which is presented to the President just
like a bill.
29. For a discussion of the history of concurrent resolutions, see Howard White, The
Concurrent Resolution in Congress, 35 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 886, 886-87 (1941).
30. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. Doc. No. 110-9, at 9 (2007), available at
http://rules.senate.gov/senaterules/Rulesu9l407.pdf; LEWIS DESCHLER, DESCHLER'S
PRECEDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ch. 24 § 5, at 4802 (1974).
31. See S. Res. 91, 109th Cong. (as passed by Senate, Mar. 17, 2005).
32. See S. Res. 320, 109th Cong. (as introduced Nov. 18, 2005).
33. See S. Con. Res. 35, 103d Cong. (1993) (recognizing that "workplace accidents
involving powered industrial trucks are often the result of operation by poorly trained,
untrained, or unauthorized operators").
34. See H.R. Con. Res. 80, 105th Cong. (as introduced May 15, 1997); see also "Made
in USA" and Other U.S. Origin Claims, 62 Fed. Reg. 63,756 n.19 (discussing concurrent
resolution).
35. See S. Con. Res. 63, 104th Cong. (as passed by Senate, June 12, 1996); see also
[Vol. 61:573
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low-cost symbolic interest group payoffs (celebrating Cancer Awareness
Month 36); (4) empty happy talk (congratulating a college football team for
winning the championship 37 ); and (5) administrative acts and housekeeping.
38
Resolutions from earlier Congresses are similar.
Congress agrees to a few dozen concurrent resolutions per year; each house
agrees to a few hundred simple resolutions per year. Most of the concurrent
resolutions fall into categories (3), (4), and (5); only a few express important
sentiments, usually regarding foreign policy. The same is true for the House's
simple resolutions. However, the Senate agrees to many, sometimes dozens of,
significant simple resolutions in the first two categories.
Consider some recent proposed and agreed-to resolutions from 2007. One
resolution expresses "disapproval of the Indiana Department of Environmental
Management's issuance of a permit allowing BP to increase their daily
dumping of ammonia and total suspended solids into Lake Michigan" 39 and
urges Indiana to reconsider the issuance. 40 Another resolution states that:
it is the goal of the United States that, not later than January 1, 2025, the
agricultural, forestry, and working land of the United States should provide
from renewable resources not less than 25 percent of the total energy
consumed in the United States and continue to produce safe, abundant, and
affordable food, feed, and fiber.
41
A third states that there should be an expansion of the program under which
state and local law enforcement authorities arrest aliens who have violated U.S.
law and encourages the Secretary of Homeland Security to ensure expedited
consideration of a border fence.42 Finally, the Iraq War Policy Resolution
Flood Compensation Program, 64 Fed. Reg. 47,358 (discussing concurrent resolution).
36. See H.R. Con. Res. 250, 109th Cong. (as introduced Sept. 27, 2005) ("[s]upporting
the goals and ideals of Gynecologic Cancer Awareness Month").
37. See S. Res. 12, 109th Cong. (as introduced Jan. 25, 2005) ("[c]ommending the
University of Southern California Trojans football team for winning the 2004 Bowl
Championship Series national championship game").
38. For example, adjournment is accomplished via resolution, as is adoption of the
House Rules to govern the session.
39. H.R. Con. Res. 187, 110th Cong. (as passed by Senate, July 24, 2007).
40. Id.
41. S. Con. Res. 3, 110th Cong. (as introduced Jan. 17, 2007).
42. H.R. Con. Res. 218, 1 10th Cong. (as introduced Sept. 24, 2007) ("[lIt is the Sense
of the Congress that--(I) Congress should verify that current immigration and border
security laws are enforced; (2) the Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure that
construction of the border fence is expedited . . . ; (3) the report required by the Secretary
should include recommendations that would enhance United States national security on the
northern border and emphasize the Administration's commitment to protecting both the
southern and northern borders . . . ; (5) construction of the fence along the southern border
should not be delayed; (6) Congress should fully fund the 18,000 Border Patrol agents as
authorized under current law; and (7) State and law enforcement [sic] should be provided the
necessary resources to prosecute those individuals who disregard United States immigration
laws.").
SOFT LA W
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expresses the sense of Congress that the United States should not dee en its
military involvement in Iraq and specifies goals for the ongoing mission. 43
These four statements provide important information to affected parties.
Factories, municipalities, and residents living along the Great Lakes will make
investments with an eye to possible congressional regulation in the future. So
will the energy industry and people who live along the borders. The Iraq
resolution signaled to the President that congressional and public support for
the Iraq intervention had waned.
C. Ambiguous or Excluded Categories
Many forms of legal pronouncements have features that resemble soft law
and therefore warrant mention even if they are not the centerpiece of our
analysis. These limitations make an already unwieldy topic more tractable.
1. Procedural rules
The Rules of Procedure in the House and the Senate are a hybrid of soft
and hard law. Because the House and Senate Rules are enacted pursuant to
established procedural formalities, they meet our definition of hard law.
However, they do not have formal legal effect outside the legislature: they are
not judicially enforceable and they are not regarded as binding law by other
legal authorities. In this way, congressional rules resemble soft law. Because
others have discussed procedural rules, 44 and because we emphasize soft law
that regulates external behavior rather than the decision making of government
bodies,45 we do not discuss procedural rules.
43. See S. Con. Res. 2, 110th Cong. (as introduced Jan. 17, 2007) ("[I]t is the sense of
Congress that--(1) it is not in the national interest of the United States to deepen its military
involvement in Iraq, particularly by increasing the United States military force presence in
Iraq; (2) the primary objective of United States strategy in Iraq should be to have the Iraqi
political leaders make the political compromises necessary to end the violence in Iraq; (3)
greater concerted regional, and international support would assist the Iraqis in achieving a
political solution and national reconciliation; (4) main elements of the mission of United
States forces in Iraq should transition to helping ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq,
conduct counterterrorism activities, reduce regional interference in the internal affairs of
Iraq, and accelerate training of Iraqi troops; (5) the United States should transfer, under an
appropriately expedited timeline, responsibility for internal security and halting sectarian
violence in Iraq to the Government of Iraq and Iraqi security forces; and (6) the United
States should engage nations in the Middle East to develop a regional, internationally-
sponsored peace and reconciliation process for Iraq.").
44. See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional
Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 361 (2004) (collecting constitutional rules that regulate
internal congressional practice).
45. We also exclude framework or procedural statutes that are duly enacted and
therefore formally legally binding, but do not directly regulate external behavior. Instead,
like internal rules, they regulate Congress's internal business. The most prominent examples
are framework statutes. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., America's Statutory
[Vol. 61:573
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2. Resolutions given legal effect by prior statutes
Sometimes a congressional enactment does not meet the formal procedural
requirements for new legislation, but is given formal legal effect because of a
prior duly enacted law. The legislative veto, for example, allows one or two
houses of Congress to override a policy decision of the executive branch or
administrative agency by using a simple or concurrent resolution. 46 The
negative legislative veto allows policy to be implemented unless Congress
disapproves; the positive legislative veto forbids policy to be implemented
unless Congress approves ex post. 47 The Supreme Court has held a negative
one-house legislative veto unconstitutional, and its reasoning clearly suggested
that the positive legislative or two-house veto would be unconstitutional as
well. 48 A related mechanism permits Congress to use a resolution to terminate
a prior statutory delegation of authority to the President. 49 The legislative veto
and related mechanisms are soft statutes in the sense that they do not satisfy the
bicameralism and presentment requirements. But they are hard law because a
prior duly enacted statute grants formal legal effect to the simple or concurrent
resolution.
'constitution", 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 7-9 (2007) (describing the regulation provided by
both constitutional mandates and framework statutes for the judicial, executive, and
legislative branches); Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 717 (2005) (identifying several examples of framework legislation
and describing five of its purposes); Ernest A. Young, Toward a Framework Statute for
Supranational Adjudication, 57 EMORY L.J. 93 (2007) (proposing "a set of statutory
principles to regulate the delegation of authority to supranational adjudicatory institutions").
46. BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO: CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF
REGULATION 8 (1983). See generally JOHN R. BOLTON, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO:
UNSEPARATING THE POWERS (1977).
47. See, e.g., Energy Conservation and Production Act, Pub. L. No. 94-385, § 305, 90
Stat. 1125 (1974) (no longer in force) (requiring sanctions involving federal assistance
performance standards for new buildings to be approved by resolution of both houses);
Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-646, § 8, 88 Stat. 2333 (1975) (no
longer in force) (requiring concurrent resolution to approve of presidential limitations for
exports to the USSR); Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 351(a)(2), 76
Stat. 872 (no longer in force) (requiring concurrent resolution to approve of Tariff
Commission recommended tariffs or duties); Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-646, § 8, 88 Stat. 2333, 2336, (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 625(e)) (requiring
concurrent resolution to approve of presidential limitations for exports to the USSR); Energy
Conservation and Production Act, Pub. L. No. 94-385, § 305, 90 Stat. 1125, 1148 (1976),
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6834) (requiring sanctions involving federal assistance performance
standards for new buildings to be approved by resolution of both houses). For more
examples, see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding the one-house legislative veto
unconstitutional); id. at 1003-13 (White, J., dissenting) (listing statutes with provisions
authorizing congressional review).
48. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946-47, 955.
49. See, e.g., Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23
(no longer in force); Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1954)
(discussing this legislation); United States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616, 621 (1951) (discussing
use of concurrent resolution as a condition subsequent for termination of legislation).
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3. Bill introduction and other internal actions and statements
It is tempting to say that the soft statute is similar to the introduction of a
bill. Bills are introduced constantly in both houses. Most are never passed; on
some, virtually no action is taken at all. At the same time, the introduction of a
bill might reveal information about congressional preferences, and in this way
may be functionally similar to a soft statute-providing weaker but still
informative signals of congressional views. A similar argument could be made
about other statements that are made in a legislative session-speeches on the
floor, statements made at oversight hearings, reports, and so on. As we will
argue in Part II.C, however, these types of statements rarely have much
credibility. In addition, they have been extensively discussed in the literature on
legislative interpretation. For these reasons, we emphasize other forms of
legislative soft law and discuss these mechanisms only in passing.
4. Ambiguously worded statutes
International relations scholars sometimes classify ambiguous treaties as
soft law. Whatever the merits of this judgment for understanding international
relations, 50 we adopt a different approach in our analysis of statutes. American
courts almost always enforce ambiguous statutes, using canons of interpretation
to clarify the meanings of those statutes. These statutes thus are lawfully
binding. In rare cases, courts refuse to enforce ambiguous statutes. In
administrative law, for example, the nondelegation doctrine-to the extent that
it remains valid law5 1 -prohibits Congress from granting authority to
executive agencies without an "intelligible principle" to guide them. The
vagueness doctrine renders criminal statutes unenforceable if they are too
vague. 52 In extreme cases where statutes are unenforceable because they are
ambiguous, it might make sense to classify them as soft law, but their very
ambiguity also means that they can have little effect on people's behavior, as
no one can know what they mean. For this reason, we will exclude ambiguous
statutes from the category of soft law as well.
5. Hortatory statutes
By contrast, there are numerous statutes that are absolutely clear and that
satisfy the procedural requirements for legislation, but that also have no formal
legal effect because the statute, by its terms, provides that the rules it sets down
cannot be enforced, or because Congress refuses to appropriate funds to enforce
50. For criticism, see GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 91-100; Kal Raustiala,
Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 581, 588-91 (2005).
51. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69
U. CHI. L. REv. 1721, 1740 (2002).
52. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
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them. 53 For example, the Supreme Court interpreted the weak language in the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act as intending "to
encourage, rather than mandate, the provision of better services to the
developmentally disabled."5 4 In another case, the Court noted that "Congress
sometimes legislates by innuendo, making declarations of policy and indicating
a preference while requiring measures that though falling short of legislating its
goals, serve as a nudge in the preferred directions." 55 Weak fair-housing laws
were sometimes said to be hortatory pronouncements with extremely weak
enforcement mechanisms. 56 Before the courts interpreted the National
Environmental Policy Act to impose procedural burdens on agencies, the
command to "consider" environmental impact was thought to impose no
enforceable obligations. 57  Consider also statutes that create voluntary
regulatory programs. 58 These hortatory statutes are hard law under our
definition because they satisfy procedural requirements; however, because they
have no binding legal effect, they resemble soft law.
6. Substantively unconstitutional statutes
Many other statutes satisfy the bicameralism and presentment
requirements, and other procedural formalities, but they are "substantively"
unconstitutional-they violate the First Amendment or due process
requirements or exceed the scope of Congress's delegated powers. We will
treat these statutes as hard statutes because, in the usual case, Congress seeks to
achieve a legal effect but is thwarted by the courts or the Constitution. In a
system with judicial review, the substantively unconstitutional statute or even
procedurally invalid statute imposes binding legal obligations unless and until a
court strikes down the statute. In a system without judicial review, when
legislators overstep constitutional limitations and the President agrees,
53. For discussions of "symbolic" statutes, see, for example, John P. Dwyer, The
Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1990) (criticizing symbolic
statutes); Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
47 DUKE L.J. 1, 74-76 (1997) (comparing instrumental, expressive, and symbolic statutes).
54. See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 20 (1981).
55. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 413 (1970).
56. Duane Lockard, The Politics of Antidiscrimination Legislation, 3 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 3, 4 (1965).
57. See ROBERT G. DREHER, NEPA UNDER SIEGE: THE POLITICAL ASSAULT ON THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 14-15 (2005); John H. Barton, Behind the Legal
Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567, 579 (1975) ("The 1969 National Environmental Protection
Act directed federal agencies to consider the environmental effects of their actions. These
hortatory provisions, perceived as unenforceable, indicated that Congress had not yet
decided what should be sacrificed for the sake of the environment.").
58. See generally Sophie Hsia, Foreign Direct Investment and the Environment: Are
Voluntary Codes of Conduct and Self-Imposed Standards Enough?, 9 ENVTL. LAW. 673
(2003).
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substantively unconstitutional statutes will nevertheless carry formal legal
force. In some cases, however, Congress might enact a statute that it expects to
be struck down, in the hope of achieving soft-law-style effects-sending a
signal to the courts that their jurisprudence conflicts with public values or to
dissenting members of the public that their behavior violates fundamental
social norms. The Flag Protection Act of 1989, struck down by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Eichman,59 is a law of this sort. The Act was passed
after the Supreme Court held flag burning a form of protected speech in Texas
v. Johnson.6° In addition, many statutes are nonjusticiable: courts refuse to hear
the merits of cases brought under them because they believe the statutes
implicate political questions such as the balance of power between the
legislative and executive branches. The War Powers Resolution, 61 which
regulates the executive's use of military force, is one such example.
62
II. How DOES SOFT LAW AFFECT BEHAVIOR?
We propose two main theories for the use of soft statutes in particular and
soft law in general. First, Congress or another lawmaking body uses soft law to
convey information about future intentions to enact hard law, allowing people
to adjust their behavior in advance of binding statutes and in some cases
avoiding constitutional requirements that apply to hard law. As we will show,
soft law can be useful in this way even when the anticipated hard-law successor
never materializes: if people adjust their behavior in anticipation of hard law,
hard-law enactment might not be necessary.
63
59. 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
60. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
61. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2000).
62. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 24-25 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J.,
concurring) ("[I]n my view, no one is able to bring this challenge because the two claims are
not justiciable. We lack 'judicially discoverable and manageable standards' for addressing
them, and the War Powers Clause claim implicates the political question doctrine."). In
principle, a rule can be hard law and nonjusticiable: other agents regard the rule as legally
binding but courts do not enforce it. In the case of the War Powers Act, Presidents have
generally declined to say that they will not comply with it, preferring to interpret it narrowly
in light of their constitutional war-making powers.
63. There is a related hard-law theory that hard laws that are not enforced may
nevertheless affect behavior by serving as a focal point around which people coordinate. See
McAdams, supra note 14. As McAdams points out, this theory can be extended to
government actions that are merely symbolic. See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal
Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 379-80 (2000) (analyzing government
displays of flags and religious symbols); see also Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and
Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765 (1998) (analyzing symbolic
government behavior). For evidence, see Patricia Funk, Is There an Expressive Function of
Law? An Empirical Analysis of Voting Laws with Symbolic Fines, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
135 (2007) (providing evidence that the abolition of voting law that was never enforced
affected voting behavior).
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Second, Congress uses soft law to convey information about its beliefs
about the state of the world-both factual and normative. The Armenian
Genocide resolution, for example, expressed the factual belief that the
Armenian Genocide actually occurred-a historical event that is officially
denied in Turkey-and the normative belief that the Armenian Genocide was
wrong, rather than (as Turkey sometimes argues in the alternative) a series of
massacres that were an excusable incident to war. Congress's beliefs about
states of the world may influence the beliefs of other people.
In both settings, soft law is a signal that provides information. Like other
signals, soft law can convey information more or less accurately and more or
less efficiently. Soft law is preferable to hard law when the signal conveys
information more reliably or more cheaply than hard law does. This Part
surveys the relevant variables that affect the direction and magnitude of these
tradeoffs.
A. Soft Law as a Strategic Instrument
1. How law conveys information
At first sight, it may seem that the difference between soft and hard statutes
is considerable. Hard statutes have the force of law; people comply with them
in order to avoid sanctions. Soft statutes do not, so people should not follow
them. However, we can profitably think about both types of statutes in a
different way. A regular statute is essentially an act of communication that
satisfies certain formal requirements set out in the Constitution and embodied
in tradition. By voting and satisfying other formalities, Congress communicates
to courts and other legal agents that certain behavior will now be subjected to
sanctions. The courts and other agents in turn interpret these communications in
light of specific disputes or factual settings, and issue orders to another set of
agents who have coercive powers-police officers, wardens, soldiers, marshals.
Thereupon these agents engage in the designated actions. Anticipating this
chain of events, most people engage in the desired behavior rather than risk
sanctions.
The agents who receive this signal from Congress do not in any sense act
automatically. Indeed, agents often refuse to comply with Congress's order.
Most commonly, judges refuse to order agents to comply with a regular statute
that violates the Constitution. Executive officials, in turn, will refuse to enforce
the statute if judges forbid them to. Less commonly, the President and
executive agencies will refuse to follow or enforce a statute if they believe that
it violates the Constitution. 64 Anticipating these responses, many ordinary
64. See Walter Dellinger, Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute
Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 199 (1994).
SOFT LA W
HeinOnline  -- 61 Stan. L. Rev. 587 2008-2009
STANFORD LAWREVIEW
people might refuse to comply with the statute. Although scholars typically
treat sanctions as "fixed," that is, exogenously determined, in fact they emerge
endogenously in a large-scale game in which people with sanctioning power
obey lawmakers only as long as lawmakers behave legitimately and lawmakers
create sanctions in anticipation of how the people with sanctioning power
respond.65
A soft statute also reveals legislative information. The relevant audience no
longer has a legal obligation to follow Congress's order, but it may nonetheless
change its behavior. When parties change their behavior in response to soft law,
it cannot be because they fear immediate formal legal sanctions. Nonetheless,
because soft law reveals information about legislative beliefs, there are settings
in which rational observers will react as if it were hard law.
2. Theories of communication
To explain the influence of soft statutes, we need a theory of how
legislative communication can influence behavior. Fortunately, there are many
such theories, and we draw on them below.
a. Signaling theories
One theory is that Congress's statement provides the addressee with
information about Congress's goals or interests. If Congress says that it
opposes the Iraq war, the public learns that Congress disapproves of the Iraq
war, or at least that it is more likely that Congress disapproves of the war than
would be the case if Congress did not make this statement. The public might
also learn more generally that Congress does not approve of preventive or
humanitarian wars. This information is useful, and it might cause some
members of the public to change their behavior. For example, investors might
be more reluctant to invest in firms that supply the military, and people who
seek military training but not combat experience might become more willing to
join the army. When one house of the legislature expresses a clear viewpoint
that diverges from the President's or the other chamber's, the public will rightly
understand that a new statute inconsistent with the one chamber's view is less
likely.
But why is Congress's statement credible? Maybe Congress does not really
mean that it disapproves of the Iraq war, but is trying to obtain some short-term
political advantage by pandering to temporary passions. Perhaps the legislature
is exploiting a transient public mood in the hope of pressuring the President to
yield in some other political disputes between the two branches.
65. See George J. Mailath et al., Maintaining Authority (Sept. 26, 2007) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.princeton.edu/%7Esmorris/pdfs/authority.pdf
(modeling legal authority).
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A standard insight of the signaling theory literature in economics is that as
a general matter, a statement is credible when it is accompanied by a costly
action-in particular, an action that is more costly for a dishonest speaker to
engage in.66 Passing resolutions is costly: it takes time that could be used for
other things-passing legislation, engaging in constituent service, meeting
supporters, enjoying leisure. These other activities benefit members of
Congress either directly or by improving their chances for reelection. If
Congress spends resources to enact a resolution disapproving the Iraq war,
observers will rationally infer that Congress cares more about this issue than it
cares about other issues for which it does not enact resolutions. In turn, people
who are taking actions with an eye toward how Congress might, in the future,
regulate the Iraq intervention or other military interventions would do well to
take note of the resolution.
There is another signaling mechanism that can explain why soft statutes are
credible. Suppose that Congress can benefit from resolutions because they let
the President know Congress's view on a particular issue-say, budgetary
priorities. If the President knows Congress's view, he can take account of it
when formulating a budget prior to its submission to Congress. By doing so,
the President can avoid a subsequent budgetary impasse that hurts both him and
Congress. 67 Moreover, if the President takes the soft statute seriously, then
Congress thereby reduces the first-mover advantage (however slight) that
otherwise accrues from the President's ability to propose an initial budget.
Congress and the President engage in repeated play extending indefinitely
into the future. The President may well adopt the strategy of taking seriously
Congress's resolutions as indications of Congress's views only as long as
Congress in fact acts consistently with the resolutions when the budget is
submitted. If Congress can commit its members to act consistently with
resolutions, then it benefits from having a reputation for complying with its
resolutions. The resolutions are credible; others, such as the President, the
courts, and the public, will believe them.
b. Cheap-talk theories
Communication can be credible even when it is not costly, as long as
certain other conditions are satisfied. One such setting exists when parties have
sufficiently aligned preferences. 68 Suppose, for example, that a congressional
oversight committee seeks to publicly disclose internal executive branch
memoranda to which it has been given access on condition that it maintain the
memoranda's confidentiality. The committee demands permission from the
66. Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. EcON. 355,361-62 (1973).
67. Cf Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1.
68. Vincent P. Crawford & Joel Sobel, Strategic Information Transmission, 50
ECONOMETRICA 1431 (1982).
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executive branch. The President prefers to avoid such disclosure but will
consent to it if the public is likely to react negatively to nondisclosure. Suppose
further that Congress has better information about the public's likely reaction
than the President does. If the oversight committee is dominated by the
opposite party, the President is not likely to heed its assurances that public
disclosure is politically necessary. A partisan committee's argument lacks
credibility because it benefits when the President's standing is damaged. But if
Congress as a whole passes a resolution advocating disclosure---especially if
known moderates and many members of the President's party support the
resolution-the claim that disclosure is politically necessary gains credibility,
and the President might therefore acquiesce.
The difference between this type of model and the signaling model is that
in the signaling model the cost associated with a particular behavior is
assumed-it is exogenous-whereas in the cheap-cost model the cost arises in
the equilibrium. In the example, the congressional resolution is assumed to be
costless; nonetheless, it conveys information to the president, and affects the
President's behavior, because some members of Congress have interests that
are aligned with those of the President.
In a related cheap-talk model, a political agent must express its view about
some issue, where there are two separate audiences with conflicting political
preferences. 69  Suppose, for example, that when Congress issues a
condemnation of the Armenian Genocide, the relevant audience consists of
Armenians and Armenian-Americans, on the one hand, and Turkey and its
American supporters, on the other hand. Assume that both groups have political
power and can punish members of Congress for adopting a resolution that they
disapprove. Here, when Congress condemns the Armenian Genocide, it incurs
a cost in the form of political pressure or loss of political opportunities from
Turkey and its supporters. Congress's willingness to incur this cost indicates
that its support for Armenia is credible. Indeed, analytically this is very similar
to the signaling game: the cost is not intrinsic, but related to a consequence of
the statement. Nonetheless, so long as the cost is observable, it will have the
same effect of producing credibility.
3. Implications
As long as Congress can credibly reveal its intentions with congressional
resolutions, it is likely that people's behavior can be affected by these
resolutions as well. If resolutions reveal Congress's policy views and hence the
path of future legislation, then potentially affected parties will adjust their
69. Joseph Farrell & Robert Gibbons, Cheap Talk with Two Audiences, 79 AM. ECON.
REv. 1214 (1989). For an overview as applied to legislative process, see David Austen-
Smith, Strategic Models of Talk in Political Decision Making, 13 INT'L POL. SCI. REv. 45, 57
(1992).
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behavior in light of their updated beliefs about the legal environment in the
future. Indeed, occasionally soft statutes anticipate, and appear to cause, the
adoption of voluntary codes of conduct. The Recording Industry Association of
America adopted advertising guidelines for notice of explicit lyrics 70 after a
congressional resolution urged a uniform labeling and disclosure system.
71
Colleges and universities adopted voluntary guidelines on illegal file-sharing
on university computer networks after congressional resolutions encouraged
such action. 72 The decision of several major food companies to restrict
advertising for "junk food" during children's television programs follows this
pattern, too. 73 It is possible, of course, that private parties would have taken
these actions even without the resolutions, but the coincidence is striking. This
way of affecting behavior need not take the form of resolutions. Simple threats
or promises from congressional leaders or oversight committees can also do the
trick, as others have noted.7 4 But soft statutes, because they reflect the views of
the entire body (a chamber, or Congress as a whole), should be a particularly
useful vehicle for accomplishing this purpose. We will consider additional
examples in Part III.
B. Soft Law as an Epistemic Instrument
In international law, much discussion has revolved around the possibility
that soft law reflects normative commitments that governments will not initially
treat as law but that nonetheless eventually influence them or their
successors. 75 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the preeminent
70. See Mariea Grubbs Hoy & J. Craig Andrews, Entertainment Industry Ratings
Disclosures and the Clear and Conspicuous Standard, 40 J. CONSUMER AFF. 117, 123 (2006)
(discussing history of the RIAA's voluntary guidelines).
71. H.R. Con. Res. 328, 101st Cong. (1990).
72. See S. Res. 488, 109th Cong. (2006) (enacted) ("Expressing the sense of Congress
that institutions of higher education should adopt policies and educational programs on their
campuses to help deter and eliminate illicit copyright infringement occurring on, and
encourage educational uses of, their computer systems and networks."); see also Vincent
Kiernan, Higher-Education Organizations Urge a Crackdown on Illegal File Sharing,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 25, 2002, at A37.
73. See H.R. Con. Res. 204, 109th Cong. (2005) (stating that "the Federal Government
has a responsibility . . . to target prevention and intervention to reduce obesity and
overweightedness in children and adolescents"); Andrew Martin, Leading Makers Agree to
Put Limits on Junk Food Advertising Directed at Children, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2006, at
C3.
74. See Matthieu Glachant, Non-binding Voluntary Agreements, 54 J. ENVTL. ECON. &
MGMT. 32 (2007); Guy Halfteck, Legislative Threats, 61 STAN. L. REv. 629 (2008) (arguing
that threat of legislative action prompted voluntary guidelines or self-regulatory changes in
the U.K. in digital obscenity, hazardous waste recycling, greenhouse-gas emissions, and
automobile pollution); Matthieu Glachant, Voluntary Agreements Under Endogenous
Legislative Threats (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working Paper No. 36.2003, 2003),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstractid=406460.
75. See, e.g., Abbott & Snidal, supra note 2.
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example. Formally, the Declaration had no legal effect; it was merely a
declaration to which states agreed on condition that it create no legal
obligations. 76 Today, it has a great deal of normative authority. States criticize
others for failing to live up to the Declaration's aspirations, and they go to the
trouble of defending themselves when subject to like criticism. How did this
happen?
An initial puzzle concerns the moral status of the Declaration itself. If the
Declaration merely embodied universal or widely held moral views, then it is
not clear what the Declaration adds to this prior moral consensus. Writing
down our moral views on a piece of paper should not make them any stronger.
On the other hand, if the Declaration deviates from moral views, then
presumably the Declaration would not have much moral force. 77
To understand how norms might spread, suppose that agents have some but
not full information about the state of the world; that their beliefs are
independent, that is, not derived from the same sources or sources that are in
some way correlated; and that they sincerely express their views through a
voting process. As the size of the group increases, the probability that the
majority will vote correctly approaches one. So even if each individual has only
a low probability of being correct, a relatively small group will jointly reveal
the correct state of the world with a probability that rapidly approaches one as
the group size increases. This phenomenon is known as the Condorcet Jury
Theorem. 7
8
In the real world, people who vote in groups do not always satisfy these
conditions. They do not always vote sincerely, and they sometimes have zero
rather than a little information about the issue in question. If individual
members of a group pick the wrong answer more often than the right answer,
then the aggregate judgment of the group will not tend towards accuracy.
Nonetheless, the larger point is that when an institution (or person) expresses
its views about a topic, it reveals information that others can benefit from, and
the informational benefits can sometimes be dramatic. 7
9
Let us distinguish two types of facts: descriptive and normative (moral). A
descriptive fact is that the Armenian Genocide occurred. A moral fact is that
the Armenian Genocide was wrong. No one doubts that descriptive facts exist;
the case for moral facts is more complicated, but it is at least plausible that
certain moral judgments are facts or otherwise have the necessary features such
that the Condorcet Jury Theorem can be applied to them. 80
76. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
77. Some scholars have argued that states might imitate other states that enjoy greater
international prestige. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States:
Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DuKE L.J. 621, 671 (2004).
78. Dharmapala & McAdams, supra note 14.
79. Id.
80. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REv.
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In the case of congressional resolutions, the Condorcet Jury Theorem
operates at two levels. The congressional resolution aggregates the votes of
members, and the congressional resolution can be treated as one vote in a
larger, more informal national or global debate about a particular moral or
descriptive fact. If one thinks that the members of Congress voted sincerely and
had independent (or roughly independent) sources of information, then one
should be more inclined to believe that the Armenian Genocide occurred (and
was wrong, assuming that moral facts exist) as a result of the resolution. And if
multiple legislatures, governments, or other institutions around the world issue
similar resolutions or statements, and one believes that they vote sincerely and
on the basis of independent sources of information, then one's inclination to
believe that the genocide occurred should be strengthened. A similar point can
be made about resolutions that praise military withdrawals and peace
agreements, 8 1 condemn human rights violations, military threats, and internal
meddling, 82 urge reform in foreign countries, 83 and identify domestic problems
that need attention. 84
There is reason to be skeptical about whether congressional resolutions
actually do work in a Condorcetian manner.85 The opposite phenomenon-
herding or cascading, where people imitate others for reputational or
informational purposes-is just as plausible. 86 Voting might simply reflect
public sentiment or a desire to go along with colleagues for other reasons. Still,
131, 136 (2006).
81. See, e.g., S. Res. 139, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted) ("[e]xpressing support for the
withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia").
82. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 738, 110th Cong. (2007) (enacted) ("[e]xpressing the sense of
the House of Representatives regarding the government of Syria's continued interference in
the internal affairs of Lebanon"); H.R. Res. 523, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted)
("[c]ondemning Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's threats against Israel"); S. Res.
63, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted) ("[c]alling for an investigation into the assassination of
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and urging steps to pressure the government of Syria to
withdraw from Lebanon").
83. See, e.g., S. Res. 231, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted) ("[e]ncouraging the
Transitional National Assembly of Iraq to adopt a constitution that grants women equal
rights under the law and to work to protect such rights").
84. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 716, 110th Cong. (2007) (enacted) (expressing the sense of the
House of Representatives with respect to raising awareness and enhancing the state of
computer security in the United States).
85. See Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory (Jan. 26, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cftm?abstractid=1087017. The theorem implies that groups have more accurate
views than individuals only if voting is sincere, which will normally conflict with the
premises of rational choice theory. See David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, Information
Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 90 AM. POL. SC. REv. 34, 42
(1996).
86. See Sushil Bikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity,
Fads, and Informational Cascades, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 151 (1998).
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if the Condorcetian theory applies with respect to either descriptive facts or
moral facts, then the soft statute can be informative and useful.
C. Soft Law Versus Hard Law: Costs and Benefits
There are two main advantages of soft law. First, it is cheaper to produce
than hard law, as it does not require presidential consent. Second, soft law more
accurately conveys information about congressional views than hard law does.
That information is particularly useful in domains where Congress acts without
the President's cooperation-as it does when it expresses its views about its
constitutional role, exercises oversight over regulatory agencies, and expresses
legislative views where the President's views are already known, are in tension
with Congress's views, or are not relevant.
The main disadvantage of soft law is straightforward: it does not produce
legally binding rules except in the uncertain case where a prior hard-law
enactment vests it with this authority. Another possible disadvantage of soft
law is that it may violate rule-of-law values such as clarity that procedural
formalities are supposed to protect. 87
1. Advantages of soft law
We have argued that soft law conveys congressional views. But Congress
also communicates using hard statutes-directly influencing behavior and
advancing normative judgments. Why are soft statutes ever a preferable
mechanism for conveying information, given that ordinary statutes convey
information and have the additional desired effect of binding force?
Cheapness. The first advantage of soft laws is that they can sometimes
accomplish what hard laws accomplish but at a lower cost. 88 Suppose, for
example, that at time 1 Congress is considering whether to pass a law at time 2.
This law will tax some behavior X However, at time 1 Congress is not certain
whether X is desirable or undesirable, or whether a law that taxed X would have
undesirable consequences. Congress could handle its uncertainty with various
hard law methods: (a) it could pass the law at time 1, realizing that it can repeal
the law if it has undesirable effects at time 2; (b) it could pass the law at time 1
and subject it to a sunset provision, realizing that it can reenact the law if it has
desirable effects at time 2; (c) it could wait until time 2 before enacting the law
and possibly make the law retroactive; (d) it could also pass the law with
moderate sanctions or loopholes so that the effect of the law reflects Congress's
87. Reducing this uncertainty is the usual explanation of the purpose of legal
formalities. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE
L.J. 557, 618-19 (1992).
88. This is a theme of the cognate literature on international soft law. See, e.g., Abbott
& Snidal, supra note 2.
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uncertainty about the undesirability of X. All of these approaches have various
costs and benefits.
89
The soft-law alternative is (for example) to issue a resolution at time 1 that
condemns X. Such a law will lead people to believe that enactment of a hard
law at time 2 is more likely but still not certain. The law will produce fewer
behavioral changes than (a) and (b) (if the sanction is high enough), but more
effects than (c). And it could have more or less effect than (d), depending on
what the sanctions and loopholes are. With respect to (a) and (b), the soft law
approach is cheaper; it need not be cheaper with respect to (c) and (d).
Depending on the degree of Congress's uncertainty and the relative costs of
enacting soft and hard law, the legislature could prefer soft law to the
alternatives. An additional advantage of the soft law is that it may stimulate
debate. Seeing that a hard law is possible in the future, people will come
forward with arguments for or against, which will in turn improve Congress's
ability to evaluate X.
90
Or consider the earlier suggestion that Congress's judgment about states of
the world can influence the public's views. Suppose Congress seeks to
condemn the Armenian Genocide while the President prefers not to, fearing
injury to American relations with Turkey. Nonetheless, the President would be
willing to sign into law a bill condemning the Armenian Genocide in return for
congressional cooperation on some other issue. A hard-law condemnation of
the Armenian Genocide would be more costly for Congress than a soft-law
condemnation would be. At the same time, the soft-law condemnation could be
just as effective as the hard-law condemnation. If the public trusts Congress but
not the President, then presidential participation in the statement adds nothing
to its credibility. Thus, in the right conditions, the cheapness of the soft law
approach can produce benefits for Congress without offsetting costs.
Information about legislative preferences. Soft statutes can be better
indicators of legislative intent than hard statutes or legislative history. 9 1 As an
indicator of underlying views of the Senate, the Senate Resolution is a better
instrument than a hard statute. As an indicator of congressional views, the
concurrent resolution is a better indicator than a hard statute. In the former
case, the views of the President and the House will affect what proposals are
89. See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121
HARV. L. REv. 543, 559-61 (2007).
90. Here, soft law is a parallel mechanism to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking or
Notice of Inquiry that administrative agencies use.
91. One caveat is in order. Whether a multimember institution actually can have an
intent has been much debated. As Kenneth A. Shepsle observed, "Congress is a they, not an
it." Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a 'They,' Not an 'It': Legislative Intent as Oxymoron,
12 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). We treat legislative intent as a stand-in for a collection
of ideas like contemplated effect, mood, or views of the legislature. In most of our analysis,
it will not matter in a significant way. If the soft statute reveals information, be it about the
world at large or about future congressional action, that is enough to generate the effects we
note.
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passed by the Senate. In the latter case, the prospect of a presidential veto will
affect the legislation that Congress proposes.92 To illustrate, suppose there are
three potential meanings of a statutory provision: A, B, and C. Congress prefers
interpretation A to B and prefers B to C. The President prefers meaning C to B
and B to A. If the President would veto a statute with meaning A, Congress will
pass a statute with meaning B. The statute is a correct indicator of
congressional intent in the sense that a majority of both houses preferred
meaning B to C and meaning B to the status quo. It is, however, a poor
indicator of what Congress thought best (meaning A) precisely because what
Congress "says" in hard statutes is a function of what the President prefers. A
hard statute is a not a clear instrument with respect to congressional intent
because it reflects the views of multiple institutions. 93
Why should one care about the intent of the Senate or House alone, or even
the two houses jointly? After all, a common view is that they can create law
only by securing the consent of the President. One reason is that this last
statement is not accurate. When Congress acts on its own (for example,
overriding a veto), or houses operate separately (the Senate handles
appointments, consents to treaties, adjudicates impeachments; the House
initiates impeachments, originates revenue bills), observers will want more
refined information than that contained in a statute. The hard statute provides
crude information because it reveals only that Congress preferred the enacted
outcome to the status quo, but it does not convey preference orderings for other
available alternatives. And when the President's views are already well known,
or the President is on his way out of office, Congress's views might be all that
people need to learn. Indeed, in several important cases that we discuss below,
Congress's views alone are of crucial importance: in Congress's effort to stake
out its constitutional role vis-a-vis that of the President, and in oversight of
regulatory agencies. In these cases, the soft statute conveys better information
about future political outputs than hard statutes do.
Soft statutes can convey information only if people have reason to believe
that they actually reflect Congress's views. Skepticism about the credibility of
congressional documents, such as legislative history, is widespread, and might
extend to soft statutes as well. Legislative actors often make statements that are
not reliable indicators of their actual views. When a legislator makes a speech
on the floor proclaiming her view on some matter, it is sometimes cheap talk.
There is virtually no cost to entering a statement in the Congressional Record.
92. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO.
L.J. 523,528-29, 532 (1992).
93. See Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Dimitri Landa, Transparency and Clarity of
Responsibility (Sept. 25, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that
accurate inferences about a given institution's views turn on clarity-the ability to infer
which actor is making a statement-and transparency-the ability to infer actual views from
a public statement).
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Other than sanctions imposed by fellow legislators or the public, there are no
concrete costs that the legislator must bear in making the statement.
Be that as it may, it is incorrect to say that the simple resolution is cheap
talk and therefore not credible; it entails some positive cost less than the cost of
enacting a statute but more than the cost of a legislative speech.94 In addition,
as we discussed in Part II.A.2.b, even cheap talk can be credible.
2. Disadvantages of soft law
The binding effect of hard law is its straightforward advantage over soft
law, and we need not dwell on this issue. A more interesting possibility is that
hard law better satisfies rule-of-law values such as publicity than soft law does.
The main distinction between hard law and soft law is that hard law complies
with formalities that clearly distinguish binding law. A central tenet of the rule
of law is that law be public, so that people may debate it, object to it, and plan
their lives around it. Secret law is anathema and perhaps soft law resembles
secret law.
This concern can be easily overstated, however. If soft law is secret, then it
cannot regulate, in which case it cannot serve any useful purpose.
Congressional resolutions themselves also comply with publicity formalities
that distinguish them from unenacted bills. Nonetheless, one might worry that
unsophisticated people, or people who cannot get legal advice, are likely to
misunderstand the importance of soft law, putting them at a disadvantage with
respect to savvier fellow citizens.
Consider, for example, Susan Rose-Ackerman's critique of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act in Pennhurst State School v. Halderman.95 The Court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that the statute created judicially enforceable rights for the
developmentally disabled, arguing instead that the weak language in the Act
indicated that Congress intended to announce a policy in the hope of eliciting a
favorable response from states. 96 Rose-Ackerman argues that the Court's
holding permitted Congress to earn public credit by enacting a statute that
expressed popular aspirations but did not have any effect. Perhaps the Court
should have "repealed" the statute, which would have embarrassed Congress
and forced it to enact clearer legislation.
97
94. Cf Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine
and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2 (2008)
(surveying legislative and agency contexts in which higher-cost actions are more credible).
95. 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Judicial Review and the Power of the
Purse, 12 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 191, 205-06 (1992).
96. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 31-32.
97. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 95, at 206.
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Importantly, the Act was not a soft statute but rather was a hortatory hard
statute. It was duly enacted but had no formal legal effect. 98 Nonetheless, one
concern is that such a statute would deceive the public, leading it to extend
credit to a Congress that accomplished nothing at all. The problem with this
view is that Congress did, in fact, do something: it announced a policy on the
treatment of developmentally disabled people, a policy that was consistent with
other hard-statute rules and could well have anticipated further legislative
developments.99 Announcing the policy in advance might well have
encouraged states and private actors to adjust their behavior in advance of hard
legislation. It is possible therefore to view soft law as facilitating rule-of-law
values rather than undermining them.
However, rule-of-law values might require that courts strike down statutes
that are ambiguous and confusing, at least in certain conditions. The rule of
lenity in criminal law reflects this idea: people should not go to jail because
they violate criminal statutes that they cannot understand. If this concern is
valid for hard law, it is even stronger for soft law, where people might not
understand that a soft statute may affect behavior. If only sophisticated people
can anticipate Congress's changing views about the treatment of
developmentally disabled people on the basis of hortatory statutes or concurrent
resolutions, then unsophisticated people are put at a disadvantage.
By the same token, if the public typically associates hard statutes with
binding obligations, then using the hortatory statute with only precatory
language creates confusion and ambiguity. If the public associates soft statutes
with nonbinding obligations, then the soft statute will be superior to the hard
hortatory statute because it will accomplish the same communicative ends, but
avoid the confusion produced by using a hard statute. In terms of public
knowledge of and reaction to soft law, rule-of-law problems are certainly not
inevitable.
A different rule-of-law objection concerns the enactment of law without
the consent of the President. If Congress can regulate with soft statutes, then
the constitutional requirement of presentment is rendered void and the
President's role in producing legislation is eliminated. The procedural
formalities of legislation do not just clarify congressional action; they also
ensure that Congress does not cut the President out of the picture. Just such a
concern lay behind the Supreme Court's rejection of the legislative veto. The
analogous concern can be found in the literature on international soft law. If
international law obtains its legitimacy from the consent of states, as is often
argued, 100 how can international soft law-that is, international law that lacks
98. 1d. at 192.
99. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 443-45 (1985).
100. See, e.g., JAMES LESLIE BRIERLY, THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND OTHER PAPERS 9-18 (1958) (discussing the consent theory).
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constitutional question in Part IV.C. For now, consider two points.
First, to the extent that the regulative power of soft law comes from the fact
that it anticipates constitutionally valid hard law (with the President's consent,
or approved in another constitutionally accepted way), then the concern falls
away. Potentially regulated parties will understand that the congressional
resolution does not predict the President's action and will place only as much
weight on the resolution as it will bear standing alone. The problem, if there is
one, arises only when a congressional resolution affects behavior by generating
knowledge about states of the world or supplying focal points, and when courts
or other legal institutions use soft law as inputs for statutory interpretation,
common law development, and other regulatory activities. In these cases,
Congress affects behavior without presidential involvement, but importantly
not by using constitutionally prohibited mechanisms. Simple and concurrent
resolutions have an old pedigree and are explicitly contemplated by the U.S.
Constitution, if not for the specific uses at issue here.
Second, any concern that soft statutes could give Congress an excessive
role in affecting public behavior must take account of the President's own
ability to sway the public using the presidency as a bully pulpit, and the
President's other institutional advantages such as the presidential signing
statement. Congress's statements about its view of the world must compete
with the President's, and in modem times the President has much greater public
visibility than Congress does. To the extent that balance of powers or influence
is a background constitutional value, resolutions would seem an important
counterbalance to the tools of the President's bully pulpit. For this reason, the
claim that soft statutes subvert legitimate presidential authority is, at least in
modem circumstances, difficult to credit.
III. APPLICATIONS
A. The Public
Congress seeks to influence public behavior, and enactment of statutes is
the normal method for doing so. As we argued above, a statute can be analyzed
as a type of communication that affects people's beliefs about the legal
consequences of their actions-in the form of sanctions (or rewards). If a
legislature enacts a statute at time 1 that governs behavior at time 2, people will
update their beliefs about the probability that a sanction will be applied to that
behavior. Enactment of a hard statute, however, only affects probabilities; it
does not create certainty. If no statute exists, people might still believe that at
101. See Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J.
INT'L L. 413, 416-17 (1983).
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time 2 a sanction will be applied to the behavior in question with probability p.
For example, Congress might enact a later statute that applies retroactively. If
instead a statute is enacted at time 1, people will raise their probability estimate
to p*, but p* need not equal 1. Congress might subsequently repeal the statute
before it has any effect or enact additional statutes that offset the sanction of the
first statute. And even if the hard statute remains in force, officials who
administer the statute will have discretion about how stringently to enforce it.
The enactment of a hard statute, then, should only cause individuals to update
their beliefs that the relevant behavior will be sanctioned in the future from p
(prior to the statute) to p *, where p < p * < 1.
Now consider a soft statute of equivalent content. By revealing information
about Congress's intentions, the soft statute will cause people, in most cases, to
update their beliefs about the probability that a sanction will be applied to the
relevant behavior at time 2. The new probability, p', in general will be less than
p*. A congressional resolution that disapproves of the relevant conduct makes
it more likely that a subsequent statute will prohibit that conduct, but tends to
increase the probability of that prohibition being in effect by less than a hard
statute would. In the case of a hard statute, the behavior will not be regulated at
time 2 only if the hard statute is repealed; in the case of a soft statute, the
behavior will not be regulated at time 2 unless a hard statute is enacted.
Nonetheless, it is important to see that we are dealing only with probabilities.
As a broad generalization, a soft statute is a cheaper but weaker instrument
than a hard statute: it is easier to pass but will have less effect on people's
beliefs about the legal regime in the future, and hence on their actual behavior.
It is not the case, however, that the soft statute will have no effect on public
behavior because it does not create legal sanctions. Even if individuals are
purely instrumental-that is, influenced only by the costs and benefits of the
given behavior-the soft statute reveals information about future legal rules,
and therefore will often affect behavior. If Congress says that it will not raise
taxes,10 2 then people should accordingly update their beliefs about the
likelihood of higher taxes. If the Senate urges that sanctions should be imposed
on the government of Myanmar, 103 then exporters will take note that they are
only one house away (plus presidential consent) from disruption of their
business. If the Senate expresses doubt about further need for emergency
unemployment payments, then those who administer or benefit from those
payments will similarly need to adjust their behavior. 104
102. See H.R. Con. Res. 208, 106th Cong. (1999) (enacted) (expressing the sense of
Congress that "there should be no increase in federal taxes in order to fund additional
government spending").
103. See S. Res. 112, 103d Cong. (1993) (enacted) ("[ujrging sanctions to be imposed
against the Burmese government").
104. See S. Res. 156, 103d Cong. (1993) (expressing doubt about further need for
emergency unemployment payments and urging the administration to propose legislation to
reform the current unemployment insurance system).
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To make the point crisper, compare a hard statute with a deferred
implementation rule. The statute is passed in the year 2015, but will not go into
effect until the year 2020. It is tempting but wrong to conclude the statute will
have no impact on public behavior between 2015 and 2020. Individuals will
anticipate the change in legal regime. This may mean they rush to complete
prohibited activity before the statute goes into effect or it may mean that
individuals start investing in substitute activities in anticipation of the new rule.
Here too, the issue is one of probabilities because the new law will not go into
effect in 2020 with certainty; it might be repealed prior to that point or
intervening statutes could limit its effect. Rational Bayesian decision makers
will, nonetheless, alter their behavior, even during the time period when the
hard statute does not yet have legal effect. 105
Despite their unenforceability, in some situations soft statutes can be more
effective than hard statutes. Suppose, for example, people are concerned about
how agencies will regulate them, and further believe that Congress, by virtue of
its oversight authority, exercises some control over agencies. 106 Congressional
resolutions that provide an indication of Congress's regulatory goals may well
provide better information about future regulations than statutes do, especially
if the statutes, because they must involve compromise with the sitting (as
opposed to future) President, have only limited influence on agency action. In a
similar way, signing statements provide a better indicator of how the President
will attempt to influence statutory implementation than the text of the statute
itself.
For example, the 109th Congress approved a resolution that the legislature
should enact mandatory, market-based limits on greenhouse-gas emissions. 
107
Expectations about binding legislation have prompted some emitters of
greenhouse gases in the United States to voluntarily agree to inventory and
reduce carbon emissions through the EPA's Climate Leaders Program. 
108
Today, a bill that regulates greenhouse-gas emissions is pending before
Congress. 10 9 Firms that adjusted in response to the soft statute may have a
105. We note again the insight from the expressive-law literature that a hard statute
can affect behavior, even if it does not create sanctions, by creating a focal point. See
McAdams, supra note 14. The same argument can be made about soft statutes even if no one
expects them to anticipate enactment of a hard statute.
106. Cf Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 61,
71, 110-19 (2006) (discussing extensive mechanisms of congressional control of
administration); H. Lee Watson, Commentary, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional
Control of the Executive, 63 CAL. L. REv. 983 (1975) (same).
107. 151 CONG. REc. S7033-37 (daily ed. June 22, 2005) (expressing the sense of the
Senate on climate change); Nicholas DiMascio, Note, Credit Where Credit Is Due: The
Legal Treatment of Early Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions, 56 DUKE L.J. 1587, 1588-
90 (2007).
108. DiMascio, supra note 107, at 1592.
109. See John M. Broder, Senate Panel Passes Bill to Limit Greenhouse Gases, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2007, at A39.
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competitive advantage should the bill pass. There are numerous other soft
statutes that fit this pattern. 
1 10
State legislatures use soft statutes to anticipate potential hard statutes in the
future as well. For example, in 1985, the Oklahoma legislature adopted a
concurrent resolution requesting that certain utility companies using coal-fired
generating plants consider blending ten percent Oklahoma coal with the
Wyoming coal that they were using. After the utility companies declined to
comply, a hard statute was passed by the subsequent legislature. After a year of
noncompliance with the hard statute, the legislature passed another concurrent
resolution directing Oklahoma's state regulatory agency to investigate the
noncompliance. 112
B. The President
1. Constitutional authority
Soft statutes can also play an important role in the allocation of authority
between Congress and the President. Consider the question of how the courts
should evaluate executive action at the boundaries of Article II authority. In
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,1 13 Justice Jackson famously
established a typology for understanding the borders of Article II power.
"When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum ...." 114 When Congress has said
nothing or there is concurrent authority, there is a "zone of twilight" 115:
110. See, e.g., S. Res. 260, 108th Cong. (2003) ("[e]xpressing the sense of the Senate
that the Secretary of Health and Human Services should take action to remove dietary
supplements containing ephedrine alkaloids from the market"); S. Res. 127, 108th Cong.
(2003) ("[e]xpressing the sense of the Senate that the Secretary of Agriculture should reduce
the interest rate on loans to processors of sugar beets and sugarcane by 1 percent to a rate
equal to the cost of borrowing to conform to the intent of Congress"); S. Res. 61, 107th
Cong. (2001) ("[e]xpressing the sense of the Senate that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs
should recognize board certifications from the American Association of Physician
Specialists, Inc., for purposes of the payment of special pay by the Veterans Health
Administration"); S. Res. 159, 103d Cong. (1993) (expressing the sense of the Senate that
the Department of Labor should fund states' worker profiling programs).
111. S. Res. 21, 40th Leg., 1985 Okla. Sess. Laws 1694. See generally Wyoming v.
Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 443 (1992).
112. S. Res. 82, 41st Leg., 1988 Okla. Sess. Laws 1915.
113. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
114. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also David J. Barron & Martin S.
Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb-Framing the Problem, Doctrine,
and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REv. 689 (2008) (examining whether or when
the President should act in contravention of congressional limitations).
115. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a
zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or
in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia,
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter,
enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. 116
The President is on weakest ground when Congress has disapproved of the
action: "When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter." 
117
Justice Jackson's language is instructive. He does not say "when a formal
statute grants or denies presidential authority." Instead, he refers to the express
or implied will of Congress, suggesting that implicit acquiescence will be
enough to justify executive action in the zone of ambiguous executive
authority.
The soft statute should be the preferred mechanism for articulating
congressional views in this setting 18 because it is a better indicator of
legislative views than legislative inaction. There are dozens of reasons
Congress fails to act, and negative inferences in the context of Article II powers
are especially hazardous. In fact, the soft law analytic frame makes clear that
Justice Jackson's typology is actually incomplete. Speaking of congressional
agreement, disapproval, or silence is unnecessarily crude. The House might
authorize the presidential action and the Senate might expressly disavow it (or
vice versa), creating a twilight of the twilight category.
In fact, Congress does sometimes use resolutions for these purposes. For
example, during 2007, a concurrent resolution was introduced, "[e]xpressing
the sense of Congress that the President should not initiate military action
against Iran without first obtaining authorization from Congress." 119 During
the same Congress, Senate Resolutions were offered to censure the President,
Vice-President, and Attorney General for conduct related to the war in Iraq,
detainment of enemy combatants, and wiretapping practices undertaken
without warrants. 120 Another proposed resolution expressed the sense of the
Senate that the President has constitutional authority to veto individual items of121
appropriation without additional statutory authorization. 1 These potential soft
116. Id.
117. Id. (footnotes omitted).
118. Cf Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Piresidential Lawmaking,
61 U. Cm. L. Rv. 123, 193-95 (1994) (discussing legislative veto-like mechanism to
disapprove executive action in fields with ambiguous constitutional authority).
119. H.R. Con. Res. 33, 110th Cong. (2007).
120. S. Res. 303, 11 0th Cong. (2007); S. Res. 302, 110th Cong. (2007).
121. S. Res. 61, 104th Cong. (1995) ("[I]t is the sense of the Senate that (1) the
Constitution grants to the President the authority to veto individual items of appropriation;
and (2) the President should exercise that constitutional authority to veto individual items of
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statutes were not passed by majorities, but they are precisely the sort of
information on the scope of permissible executive authority that would inform
Justice Jackson's analysis. 122
In this scenario, legislative sentiments, expressed in nonbinding
mechanisms, are taken as inputs in the decision-making processes of other
institutions-the courts-that themselves generate binding rules, that is, hard
law. Even without judicial involvement, however, resolutions that assert
congressional authority or limitations on presidential authority may influence
the way that the two political branches share power with each other--either as
moves in a game where each side must both cooperate and compete, or as
appeals to public opinion. 
123
2. Soft statutes as political support
This is not, however, the only way for a soft statute to affect presidential
decision making. Suppose that the President announces that recent
developments in Iran pose a threat to the interests of the United States and he
intends to send troops. Congress enacts one of two potential soft statutes. The
first proclaims that a majority of both houses of Congress disagree with the
President's determination. The hostilities, in the view of the legislature, do not
constitute a threat to U.S. interests. The second potential soft statute proclaims
agreement with the President's determination and expresses the mood of the
chambers that the conflict warrants U.S. engagement. Even if neither resolution
generates legal authority for the President's troops, a soft statute might
nonetheless affect presidential decision making in two ways.
If the President believes that he will need congressional cooperation to
complete a successful military campaign, he will need to pay attention to the
views of the legislature. The President will need appropriations, of course; he
may also have needs incidental to the war effort where his constitutional power
does not plausibly extend-to raise the salaries of officers, for example. He
may need Congress to cooperate in his domestic programs, and a Congress that
appropriation without awaiting the enactment of additional authorization.").
122. Beyond these contemporary examples, it also bears mention that one of the major
targets of concurrent resolutions historically was foreign policy. See Buckwalter, supra note
17. Many of these efforts tried to use soft statutes as mechanisms of hard law by making
authorization, implementation, or termination of previously enacted statutes a condition of
subsequently enacted concurrent resolutions. For example, the Neutrality Act of 1939
allowed either the President "or Congress by concurrent resolution to determine the
existence of state of war between foreign states." Ch. 2, 54 Stat. 4 (1939). The soft statute in
this scenario is like the legislative veto; it seeks to make hard law using the soft-statute
mechanism. Like the legislative veto, these efforts are hybrid mechanisms in our scheme.
They comply with statutory procedural requirements, but arguably are not constitutional
procedural requirements.
123. Cf Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1 (discussing how Congress and the President
assert and defend their constitutional roles against each other).
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opposes the war may be unwilling to do so. The soft statute will express
Congress's opposition more effectively than communications from leaders or
other members because Congress acts as a body. If Congress later breaks its
word, then its credibility will be diminished, and future efforts to influence the
President will be hampered. To avoid this institutional cost, members of
Congress may feel bound by earlier votes.
Alternatively, the soft statute might have Condorcetian effects, revealing
that members of Congress independently agree or disagree with the President's
assessment. Such a resolution might affect the President's own views, but even
if it does not, it could affect the views of important others-the American
public or foreign governments, for example. Since the President needs the
cooperation of these groups, the soft statute influences future presidential
decisions.
For example, a concurrent resolution introduced in the 104th Congress
expressed Congress's opposition to President Clinton's planned deployment of
United States ground forces to Bosnia. 124 A proposed Senate resolution in the
next session urged the President to facilitate the withdrawal of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards from Bosnia-Herzegovina. 125 The first resolution
signaled potential opposition in Congress. The second expressed support for a
potential action by the President. Similarly, a proposed concurrent resolution in
2001 expressed "support for the President in using all means at his disposal to
encourage the establishment of a democratically elected government in
Iraq." 126 Contrast an alternative proposed resolution urging that the United
States work through the United Nations to assure Iraq's compliance with
existing U.N. resolutions. 127 Each proposed resolution reveals information both
about legislative preferences and about the underlying state of the world.
124. S. Con. Res. 35, 104th Cong. (1995).
125. S. Res. 225, 104th Cong. (1996).
126. H.R. Con. Res. 286, 107th Cong. (2001); see also H.R. Con. Res. 460, 107th
Cong. (2002) ("Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is
the sense of Congress that the President may order acts of war against a foreign or other
entity only in the following circumstances: in compliance with a treaty obligation or to repel
a military attack against United States territory, possessions, or Armed Forces engaged in
peaceful maneuvers; to participate in humanitarian rescue operations; or in response to a
declaration or resolution of prior specific approval by a majority of the Members of each
House of Congress.").
127. H.R. Con. Res. 473, 107th Cong. (2002) ("Resolved by the House of
Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the United States should work through the
United Nations to seek to resolve the matter of ensuring that Iraq is not developing weapons
of mass destruction, through mechanisms such as the resumption of weapons inspections,
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, regional arrangements, and other peaceful means.").
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C. Agencies
Congress uses a range of instruments to influence administrative agencies,
including restrictions on the appointment and removal of personnel,
specification of substantive or procedural restrictions, appropriations, oversight
hearings, and deadlines. Before the Supreme Court held it unconstitutional, the
legislative veto was another such mechanism. 12 8 Assume that the hard law
version of the legislative veto is unavailable because it is unconstitutional.
Could a soft statute variant accomplish similar ends?
129
INS v. Chadha addressed whether a person's immigration status could be
adjusted by a simple resolution, where the initial decision to adjust or not was
made by the Attorney General. 13 0 Consider a hypothetical variant. Suppose the
Attorney General makes a determination that person A should be deported.
Using a concurrent resolution, both houses of Congress object to this
determination and urge the Attorney General to reverse it. The Attorney
General has no legal obligation to do as Congress wishes, but the Attorney
General may nonetheless be influenced by the resolution. As between
contradicting the wishes of Congress and avoiding a confrontation, the latter
will often be preferred because Congress controls appropriations, holds
oversight hearings, and has other ways to express displeasure. In this way, the
soft legislative veto would do some of the practical work done by the hard
legislative veto. To make the actual legal adjustment to immigration status,
action by the executive branch would still be required, but the nonbinding
congressional resolution increases this probability, perhaps substantially.
Congress does, in fact, use soft statutes to affect agency behavior. Agencies
also reference soft statutes in their decision-making process. Consider the
FTC's proposed changes to the "Made in USA" labeling requirements."'3 Over
200 members of the House cosponsored a resolution opposing the proposed
guidelines and urging the commission to retain the old standards. 13 2 The FTC
ultimately abandoned the proposed changes, citing, in part, the opposition in
Congress. 13
3
In another case, a 1988 concurrent resolution sought "[t]o acknowledge the
contribution of the Iroquois Confederacy of Nations... and to reaffirm the
continuing government-to-government relationship between Indian tribes and
128. See supra Part I.C.2.
129. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Some Thoughts on the Veto, 40 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 87,99 (1976).
130. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
131. See 60 Fed. Reg. 53,922 (Oct. 18, 1995).
132. H.R. Con. Res. 80, 105th Cong. (1997); 62 Fed. Reg. 63,756, 63,758 (1997); see
also S. Con. Res. 52, 105th Cong. (1997) (supporting retention of the "all or virtually all"
standard).
133. See 62 Fed. Reg. 63,756 (Dec. 2, 1997) (discussing H.R. Con. Res. 80, 105th
Cong. (1997)).
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the United States established in the Constitution." 134 The Federal Emergency
Management Agency took the statement to be a relevant input in its decision to
formulate a "government-to-government" relationship policy with American
Indian tribes. 135 Another concurrent resolution suggested that the proceeds of a
reserve fund should be used for the assistance of livestock producers adversely
affected by disaster conditions. 136 In response, the Secretary of Agriculture did
so. 137 Even resolutions not formally voted on may influence agency behavior.
Resolutions introduced in both the House and the Senate, with strong bipartisan
support, 138 urged that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) revise regulations on powered industrial truck operator training. Soon
thereafter, OSHA published a notice of proposed rulemaking to revise the
training requirements. 139 It has long been appreciated that Congress uses all
sorts of formal and informal mechanisms to influence administrative
agencies. 140 Other mechanisms enjoy the lion's share of scholarly attention,but soft statutes are critical mechanisms in this regard as well.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR COURTS
A. Statutory Interpretation
Soft statutes can be useful for statutory interpretation in two ways. First, if
the legislative intent behind a hard statute is relevant to interpretation of that
statute, then a contemporaneous or subsequent soft statute that reveals the
legislative intent provides relevant information for an interpreter such as a
court. Second, if a later Congress's policy views are relevant for interpreting or
construing the earlier statute, then the interpreter should draw on soft statutes in
order to obtain information about these views as well. 141
134. H.R. Con. Res. 331, 100th Cong. (1988).
135. Final Agency Policy for Government-to-Government Relations with American
Indian and Alaska Native Tribal Governments, Part VI, 64 Fed. Reg. 2096 (Jan. 12, 1999).
136. S. Con. Res. 63, 104th Cong. (1996) (enacted).
137. Flood Compensation Program, 64 Fed. Reg. 47,358 (Aug. 31, 1999).
138. See S. Con. Res. 17, 102d Cong. (1992) (55 cosponsors); H.R. Con. Res. 92, 102d
Cong. (1991) (236 cosponsors from both parties).
139. Powered Industrial Truck Operator Training, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,782 (proposed Mar.
14, 1995) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1917, and 1918). See also the
examples in supra note 109.
140. See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984).
141. But see Gibson, supra note 16 (arguing that subsequently passed interpretive
resolutions should not control judicial interpretation because this would allow Congress to
amend or repeal prior statute without signature of the President and interpretation of the law
is a judicial rather than legislative function).
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The first argument sits atop a complicated debate about the value of
preenactment and postenactment legislative history. Some scholars and judges
believe that courts should not rely on legislative history as evidence of
legislative intent because members of Congress can easily insert statements in
the record that contradict the views of the majority that passed the statute. 142
Other scholars and judges believe that courts should use those portions of
legislative history that are credible, such as committee reports, statements by
sponsors, or speeches just prior to votes. 143 The latter group should have no
objection if courts rely on contemporaneous resolutions expressing Congress's
understanding of a statute. Such resolutions are better indicators of
congressional understanding than virtually any other form of legislative history.
Legislative-history skeptics should object less to giving interpretive authority to
resolutions than to other types of preenactment and postenactment legislative
history produced during the enacting period Congress: resolutions express the
views of a majority, while other legislative history does not. 14 4
However, it would be unusual for Congress to issue a resolution expressing
its understanding of a statute at the same time that it passes a statute, and we
have found no such example. 145 In the more usual case, Congress passes a
resolution subsequently-later in the same session or during a later session-in
response to a supervening event. The question then arises whether this
postenactment history should be given weight by courts when interpreting the
earlier enactment. For example, in December 2006, President Bush signed the
Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act into law and issued a signing
statement construing a provision to permit searches of sealed mail in exigent
circumstances. 146 In January 2007, a Senate Resolution was introduced
"[r]eaffirming the constitutional and statutory protections accorded sealed
142. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997). See generally Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423 (1988)
(discussing judges' and scholars' concern about the extent to which legislative history
reflects a coherent congressional view).
143. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845 (1992) (arguing that legislative history can reveal legislative
intent or purpose and resolve statutory ambiguity).
144. This line of argument sets aside scholars and judges who do not think the intent of
the legislature is relevant for statutory interpretation.
145. The closest example we have found is S. Con. Res. 107, 81st Cong. (as passed by
Senate, Sept. 12, 1950), which was passed by the Senate within sixty days of the enactment
of the G.I. Bill of Rights, Pub. L. No. 610, 64 Stat. 336 (1950), and would apparently have
passed the House shortly thereafter, but for a congressional recess. The resolution purported
to clarify the intent of the enacting legislature with respect to interpretation of the act. See
Gibson, supra note 16, at 421-22 (discussing statute and resolution); id. at 479 ("During the
past forty years at least, [1910-1950] there have been very few congressional attempts, by
concurrent resolution, to construe federal statutes.").
146. Statement on Signing the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, 42
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2196 (Dec. 20, 2006).
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domestic mail." 14 7 The resolution could be interpreted as an effort to reassert
the legislative understanding of the original statute; if so, a court might
properly rely on it when interpreting the Postal Accountability and
Enhancement Act.
In the sealed mail example, the enactment of the statute, the intervening act
(President Bush's signing statement), and the postenactment soft statute
occurred within a few months of each other. Sometimes a good deal more time
elapses. For example, in 1983, the House passed a resolution purporting to
declare the intent of the 1972 legislature about the breadth of Title IX. 148 Here,
we might expect a court to be more suspicious about the House's claim to know
the legislative intent of the 1972 Congress, and, in fact, the conventional rule is
that courts should give no weight to such resolutions. 14 9 "[T]he views of a
subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an
earlier one."
150
147. S. Res. 22, 110th Cong. (2007). The debate concerned the Postal Accountability
and Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 109-435, 120 Stat. 3198 (2006).
148. H.R. Res. 190, 98th Cong. (1983), 129 CONG. REc. H10100 (daily ed. Nov. 16,
1983) (declaring that Title IX intended institution-wide rather than program-specific
prohibitions on discrimination on the basis of sex). Under the "program-specific" approach,
receipt of federal funds would trigger Title IX's obligations only within cabined programs or
departments. The "institution-wide" approach implies that the receipt of federal funds by any
subdivision of the institution or university triggers obligations for the entire institution.
149. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV.
67, 96 (1988) ("Thus, nonbinding resolutions, passed by both Houses of Congress but not
presented to the President, are not formally entitled to authoritative weight in statutory
interpretation."); see also John C. Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for
Legislative Intent: A Venture into "Speculative Unrealities", 64 B.U. L. REv. 737, 748
(1985) (noting that the Supreme Court has shown great reluctance to give weight to
subsequent resolutions for construction of earlier statutes, and discussing the failure of the
Grove City College Court even to mention a subsequent concurrent resolution that spoke
directly to whether Title IX was program-specific or institution-wide). But see Butler v. U.S.
Dep't of Agric., 826 F.2d 409, 413 n.6 (5th Cir. 1987); see also N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v.
Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535 (1982); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 686 n.7 (1979);
F.H.E. Oil Co. v. Comm'r, 150 F.2d 857, 858 (1945) ("The Resolution ... does not make
law, or change the law made by a previous Congress or President. ... As an expression of
opinion on a point of law it would ... be entitled to most respectful consideration by the
courts ... ").
150. United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960); see also Massachusetts v. EPA,
127 S. Ct. 1438. 1461 n.27 (2007) (quoting Price); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe,
522 U.S. 329, 355 (1998) (citing Price); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 420 (1994) ("The
subsequent history is less illuminating than the contemporaneous evidence"); Andrus v.
Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 n.8 (1980) ("[Wlhile arguments predicated upon
subsequent congressional actions must be weighed with extreme care, they should not be
rejected out of hand as a source that a court may consider in the search for legislative
intent."); Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 n.1l (1979) (noting that isolated
statements made by members of Congress after the enactment of a statute cannot substitute
for legislative intent at the time of enactment); Cobell v. Norton, 428 F.3d 1070, 1075 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) ("[P]ost-enactment legislative history is not only oxymoronic but inherently
entitled to little weight."); Eskridge, supra note 149, at 95 (quoting Price). For an earlier
attempt to use a concurrent resolution to influence interpretation of a previously enacted
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However, this rule sits uneasily with another judicial practice-that of
giving weight to legislative inaction by subsequent legislatures. 15 1 Legislative
inaction is sometimes interpreted as implicit approval of a judicial or agency
interpretation of an earlier statute. 152 The acquiescence rule infers legislative
approval from the failure to overrule a prior interpretation. The reenactment
rule infers legislative approval of a prior interpretation when a legislature re-
enacts or amends a statute without specifically changing the prior
interpretation. The rejected proposal rule presumes majoritarian approval of a
prior interpretation when an amendment altering a judicial interpretation (or
changing the text of a statute to clarify) is considered, but rejected in
Congress. 153 Each of these rules creates a presumption about legislative views
on the basis of congressional inaction or congressional action that has multiple
interpretations.
There is ample reason to be skeptical of the Court's periodic reliance on
congressional inaction in subsequent legislatures for purposes of statutory
interpretation, 154  and recent judicial treatment is less hospitable. 155
Nevertheless, if subsequent congressional silence of this sort is ever relevant
for statutory interpretation, surely congressional voice (in the form of soft
statutes) should be as well. 156 Congress may not always have an incentive to
express its views candidly, 157 but there is no reason to think that voice
approved by a majority will be usually less reliable than silence.
statute, see S. Con. Res. 4, 69th Cong. (as passed Jan. 9, 1928), interpreting the Tariff Act of
1922, 42 Stat. 858 (1922), such that "with respect to imported broken rice, 'broken rice'
shall include only the class 'brewers' milled rice,' as specified in the united standards for
milled rice." Interestingly, the House refused to enact the concurrent resolution, stating in
House Resolution 92 that the proposed concurrent resolution "contravenes the first clause of
the seventh section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States." H. Res. 92,
70th Cong. 2d Sess. (Jan. 16, 1928); see also Gibson, supra note 16, at 480 (discussing
interaction between the House and Senate on the issue).
151. See Eskridge, supra note 149; Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation,
Legislative Inaction, and Civil Rights, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2 (1988).
152. N. Haven Bd of Educ., 456 U.S. at 535. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Post-Enactment Legislative Signals, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75 (1994) (discussing
legislative inaction as a ratification of statutory precedents).
153. Eskridge, supra note 149, at 69.
154. See Eskridge, supra note 149, at 95-108 (surveying range of formalist, realist, and
systemic problems with inferring legislative intent from inaction). But see Farber, supra note
15 1, at 10 (noting that subsequent legislative silence is informative of approval, even if not
perfectly informative).
155. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n. 1 (1989).
156. See Mass. Credit Union Share Ins. v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 693 F. Supp.
1225, 1230-31 (D.D.C. 1988). For a similar proposal, see Greene, supra note 118. Greene
argues in favor of allowing concurrent resolutions to block the exercise of the presidential
powers exercised pursuant to an implicit delegation.
157. For a discussion of legislative incentives to tell the truth, see McNollgast,
Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1994) [hereinafter McNollgast, Legislative Intent]; McNollgast,
Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J.
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The second argument rests on a more controversial premise, but if the
premise is accepted, then the case for relying on postenactment soft statutes to
interpret previously enacted hard statutes is even stronger. The premise is that
when a court interprets a statute that was enacted by a past Congress, it should
allow itself to be influenced by the views of the current Congress.' 5 8 Others
have argued that, whether courts should be influenced in theory by the current
Congress, they will be influenced in practice, because the current (or future)
legislature could overturn the court's decision and judges dislike seeing their
holdings overturned. 159 For these scholars, congressional resolutions should be
reasonable devices for Congress to reveal its evolving policy views to judges.
As a possible illustration of this view, consider the dissent by Justice Souter in
Garcetti v. Ceballos.160  Justice Souter relied, in part, on Congress's
endorsement, via concurrent resolution, of the view that citizens should expose
corruption in government to inform his view on the scope of First Amendment
protection for government employees. 161
We already noted the 1983 House Resolution attempting to clarify
legislative views on the meaning of Title IX.1 6 2 State legislatures also
occasionally use resolutions for similar reasons. For example, in response to
confusion in the courts, the Michigan legislature passed a concurrent resolution
declaring that an existing statute was "not designed to disrupt benefits which
were already being received by an employee prior to the effective date of this
act or benefits resulting from injuries incurred prior to the act's effective
date."' 163 The Delaware legislature once passed a concurrent resolution
clarifying that the repeal of a statute was not to be applied retroactively. 164 In
Vaught v. Wortz, 165 the Delaware supreme court held that the ambiguity in the
initial statute was properly resolved by the subsequent concurrent resolution
"which evidence[d] a clear legislative intent that the Repealer is to be given
only prospective application." 166
705 (1992) [hereinafter McNollgast, Positive Canons].
158. Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REv.
2162 (2002); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L.
REv. 2027 (2002).
159. McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 157.
160. 547 U.S. 410, 432 n.4 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
161. Id.
162. H.R. Res. 190, 98th Cong. (1983).
163. S. Con. Res. 575, 81st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1982). The concurrent
resolution was adopted by the state senate on April 1, 1982, and by the state house on May
18, 1982. 1982 House J. 1262; 1982 Senate J. 626, 706-707; see Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 184 (1992).
164. See Marcucilli v. Boardwalk Builders, No. 99C-02-007, 2000 Del. Super. LEXIS
137, at *16 (Del. Super Ct. Apr. 13, 2000) (discussing the repeal of the Automobile Guest
Statute by the Delaware General Assembly and the General Assembly's subsequent passage
of the concurrent resolution stating that the repeal would not be applied retroactively).
165. 495 A.2d 1132 (Del. 1985).
166. Id. at 1133. Other state courts disagree. See State v. Barnes, 45 P.2d 293, 297
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A soft statute purporting to clarify the meaning of an earlier hard statute
should not control if the text of the earlier statute is clear. In a case of statutory
ambiguity however, a soft statute should be given weight. Unlike other forms
of legislative history-commonly given weight by judges already-the soft
statute is majoritarian and provides a better indication of congressional intent
than congressional silence or inaction.
If we are right, it is puzzling that Congress rarely uses soft statutes in this
way. However, there is a possible explanation. Given that courts rarely permit
Congress to offer interpretations of earlier statutes by passing resolutions, there
is no reason for Congress to enact them. If judicial practice changed,
congressional behavior would likely shift as well.
B. Constitutional Interpretation
There are many views about which institution should have ultimate
authority to say what the Constitution means, but scholars and judges with
divergent interpretive philosophies agree that legislative interpretations of the
Constitution should have some weight, and this consensus appears to be
accepted by the Supreme Court as well. 167 A long history of a congressional
practice is often taken as evidence that the Constitution does not prohibit that
practice. 168 Indeed, in exercising only narrow judicial review of statutes, the
Supreme Court often emphasizes that it takes a deferential approach-
implicitly acknowledging that Congress's judgment about the constitutionality
of legislation deserves weight. As a practical matter, when Congress decides
that a statute would not be constitutional and therefore does not pass it, it will
not matter that the Supreme Court disagrees. 169 Additionally, the political
question doctrine carves out swaths of constitutional controversy that the
judiciary will not resolve. 170 When the Constitution commits an interpretive
question to another branch or when there are no judicially ascertainable
standards, courts let the political branches resolve the dispute. 171 And
(Idaho 1935) (Morgan, J., concurring) ("It is not, in the Constitution, anywhere directed or
permitted that the Legislature, having enacted a law, shall dictate the interpretation or
construction to be placed upon it.").
167. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 267-69 (2006).
168. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200 (2003) ("History reveals an
unbroken congressional practice of granting to authors of works with existing copyrights the
benefit of term extensions so that all under copyright protection will be governed
evenhandedly under the same regime.").
169. See Daniel A. Farber, Legislative Constitutionalism in a System of Judicial
Supremacy, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 431, 436 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006).
170. See id. at 443; Mark Tushnet, Non-Judicial Review, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 453
(2003).
171. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (discussing justifications for and
applications of political question doctrine).
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Congress's judgments about the constitutionality of its internal procedures
often receive absolute deference from the courts. 172 For those more skeptical of
judicial supremacy, 17 3 legislative views about constitutional meaning are all
but dispositive. Thus, although scholars differ about the amount of weight
congressional judgments about the Constitution deserve, nearly everyone
agrees that they deserve at least some weight.
If congressional views of constitutional meaning have importance, then the
question arises what mechanism is likely to be most effective for articulating a
body of legislative constitutional law. Unfortunately, the mechanism for
articulating legislative views about the Constitution has received little attention
from commentators. Prior suggestions include using committee reports,
174
confirmation hearings, 175 and the brute fact of legislative enactment or
approval. 176 Each of these mechanisms is inferior to soft statutes as a way of
advancing legislative views about constitutional law. Unlike the first two, the
concurrent resolution requires the support of a majority of Congress and thus
presumptively expresses the view of Congress as a whole. Unlike the third, the
resolution need not be influenced by the President's view.
One might argue that only hard statutes should be valued in constitutional
interpretation. The case for relying on hard statutes is that when the legislature
172. For example, the enrolled-bill rule dates to Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143
U.S. 649, 672-73 (1892) (holding that the judiciary must treat the attestations of "the two
houses, through their presiding officers" as "conclusive evidence that [a bill] was passed by
Congress"). See also Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(declining to review whether passage of different versions of a bill by House and Senate
violated constitutional requirements). But see United States v. Mufioz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385,
387-88 (1990) (holding a special assessment statute did not violate the Origination Clause on
grounds it was not a bill for raising revenue). Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment,
applying Marshall Field's enrolled-bill rule. Id. at 408-09 (Scalia, J., concurring).
173. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999); ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT
SMALL (2007); Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional
Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REv. 585 (1975); Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule,
Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277 (2001); see also Neal
Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335 (2001) (arguing
that the legislature should use mechanisms of advice and consent or impeachment for
purposes of constitutional interpretation).
174. Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 173; Keith E. Whittington et al., The Constitution
and Congressional Committees: 1971-2000, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH, supra note
169, at 396.
175. Katyal, supra note 173.
176. That is, if Congress passes a statute of dubious constitutionality, the fact of
enactment should be taken as evidence that the Constitution permits the statute. See, e.g.,
Mark Tushnet, Interpretation in Legislatures and Courts: Incentives and Institutional
Design, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH, supra note 169, at 355. In the same volume,
Daniel A. Farber describes settings in which the legislature exercises constitutional power
that is not reviewed by courts (e.g., impeachment and regulation of internal functions of the
legislature); therefore, the legislature has practical final say. Farber, supra note 169, at 431,
436.
SOFT LA W
HeinOnline  -- 61 Stan. L. Rev. 613 2008-2009
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
and the President agree, their agreement is more likely to reflect a
constitutional norm than when they do not agree. As constraints on regular
politics, constitutional norms are typically thought to require a public
consensus, and the implicit supermajoritarianism of the legislature-and-the-
President could be better evidence of such a consensus.
But the hard-statute approach has defects as well. One problem is that
when a bill is not enacted because legislators harbor constitutional concerns,
reliable evidence of their constitutional views may be difficult to identify. A
committee report might claim that the bill is unconstitutional, 177 or the
Congressional Record might contain pronouncements to that effect. However,
because there are dozens of reasons why a bill fails to pass, fragments of the
legislative history of an unenacted bill are a hazardous way to advance a
coherent body of constitutional law. Those who thought the bill constitutional
will later claim that the bill had nothing to do with the constitutional dispute.
There will be no reliable way to evaluate these claims.
In addition, if a hard statute is the only legislative vehicle for articulating
constitutional views, some statements will not be produced because of an
anticipated presidential veto, even when Congress thinks the statute
constitutionally unproblematic. Especially when a particular bill has
implications for the constitutional roles of Congress and the President,
Congress and the President might have good-faith disagreement about the
relevant constitutional norms. The President may veto statutes that violate his
interpretation of his constitutional powers, in which case Congress's opposing
interpretation will not have a formal public airing. In this case, the legislature
alone must advance its interpretation of the Constitution; the legislature and the
President can only advance a consensus interpretation. 178 Exclusive reliance on
hard statutes will produce a body of constitutional law that is biased and
incomplete.
In both cases, the soft statute is a better vehicle for legislative
constitutional interpretation. Congressional majorities would indicate that they
do not proceed with a proposed hard statute because they believe that it is
unconstitutional. This judgment also would produce legislative precedent.
Congress's constitutional views would have a formal venue akin to the
presidential signing statement and the Department of Justice opinion, and
courts would know where to look for the legislature's interpretation of the
Constitution. 179 Courts might or might not give much weight to these
177. As proposed by Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 173, at 1308.
178. For a similar proposal, see Greene, supra note 118 (advocating use of concurrent
resolutions to negate some presidential powers, drawing on Justice Jackson's Youngstown
concurrence).
179. Other mechanisms exist as well. The House and Senate precedents are in this
vein; they contain legislative precedents, viewed as more or less binding, on procedures used
to generate legislation. See generally CLARENCE CANNON, CANNON'S PRECEDENTS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES (U.S. Gov't Printing Office ed. 1936);
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statements, again, depending on their theory about the role of the legislature in
determining constitutional meaning. Much would also depend on traditional
indications of credibility: whether both houses or just one passed the resolution
and the extent of the majority; and whether the interpretation has been
advanced consistently by a succession of Congresses over time 18 or for the
first time; and so forth.
The advantage of soft statutes over committee reports or hearings is clear
as well. The majoritarian nature of soft statutes makes them more credible than
committee reports or hearings; soft statutes are more reliable (for courts and the
public) indicators of legislative views. 181 In addition, soft statutes would give
Congress the best chance to develop an institutional position on its
constitutional role, one that could compete effectively with the executive's
longstanding position on executive power, which has gained authority because
it has been maintained across successive presidencies.
Both state and federal legislatures sometimes use resolutions in this way.
As early as 1873 the Missouri legislature adopted a resolution expressing
"grave doubts" about the constitutionality of a hard statute. 182 The Mississippi
legislature used a concurrent resolution to condemn the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Brown. 183 In the current U.S. Congress, a concurrent resolution was
introduced "expressing the sense of Congress that the Supreme Court
misinterpreted the First Amendment to the Constitution in the case of Buckley
v. Valeo." 184 Another House resolution stated that federal judges should not
treat foreign law as a source of authority for interpreting U.S. constitutional
law. 185 As we saw earlier, Congress used a concurrent resolution to disagree on
constitutional grounds with a presidential signing statement that interpreted a
statute to permit the executive branch to inspect sealed domestic mail.
186
Congress has also used resolutions to express views on the meaning of the
Second Amendment, 187  the First Amendment, 
188  federalism, 189
ASHER HINDS, HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED
STATES (U.S. Gov't Printing Office ed. 1936).
180. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding practice of paying
legislative chaplains despite Establishment Clause, partially because practice dates back to
first Congress).
181. Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 173, at 1307-09.
182. See Woodson v. Murdock, 89 U.S. 351 (1874).
183. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 197 (1970).
184. H.R. Con. Res. 6, 110th Cong. (2007).
185. H.R. Res. 372, 110th Cong. (2007).
186. See Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 109-435, 120 Stat.
3198 (2006); S. Res. 22, 110th Cong., CONG. REc. S394-95 (2007).
187. H.R. Con. Res. 27, 101st Cong. (1989) (expressing the "sense of the Congress
that the Constitution provides that all individual citizens have the right to keep and bear
arms, which right supersedes the power and authority of any government").
188. See H.R. Con. Res. 194, 109th Cong. (2005) (display of Ten Commandments in
public buildings does not violate the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States); H.R. Con. Res. 428, 107th Cong. (2002) (recitation of pledge of allegiance in public
SOFT LA W
HeinOnline  -- 61 Stan. L. Rev. 615 2008-2009
STANFORD LA W REVIEW
apportionment, 190 Supreme Court decisions, 191 executive authority, 192 and the
scope of federal powers. 193
Congress could probably use soft statutes in a more effective way than it
has so far. Consider the longstanding dispute between the executive branch and
the Senate over the proper role of Senate "ratification history" for the
interpretation of a treaty. The executive branch believes that statements in
committee reports, debates, and hearings in the Senate should have little weight
in interpretations of treaties; 194 the Senate disagrees. The Senate's view was
awkwardly attached as a condition to its advice and consent to a particular
treaty. 19 5 The President ratified the treaty while expressing disagreement with
the Senate's view. 196 In essence, the Senate used a resolution-like mechanism
to advance its interpretation of its constitutional authority, one that courts can
then consider when deciding how to use Senate ratification history in order to
interpret a treaty. Because the President and the Senate disagreed about the
relevant constitutional norm, the hard-statute (or hard-treaty) approach to
legislative involvement in constitutional interpretation could not be used.
schools is constitutional under the First Amendment); H.R. Con. Res. 199, 106th Cong.
(1999) (prayers at public schools and sporting events "are constitutional under the First
Amendment to the Constitution"); H.R. Con. Res. 294, 103d Cong. (1994) (Department of
Housing and Urban Development should not interfere with exercise of free-speech rights);
H.R. Con. Res. 35, 101st Cong. (1989) ("public desecration of the United States flag is not
considered symbolic speech under the first amendment to the Constitution").
189. See H.R. Con. Res. 299, 105th Cong. (1998) (specifying criteria for executive
departments to follow when preempting state law consistent with the Constitution); H.R.
Con. Res. 161, 101st Cong. (1989) (expressing the "sense of the Congress that it is in the
interest of a viable Federal system of Government that primary regulatory authority over
alcohol beverages within their borders shall remain with the States").
190. See H.R. Con. Res. 195, 101st Cong. (1989) (expressing the "sense of the
Congress that illegal aliens should not be counted in the 1990 decennial census for purposes
of congressional reapportionment").
191. See H.R. Con. Res. 160, 102d Cong. (1991) (resolving, in response to Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), that "no Federal employee ... may be denied freedom of
speech").
192. See H.R. Con. Res. 102, 108th Cong. (2003) ("[P]ursuant to Article I, Section 8
of the Constitution of the United States, Congress has the sole and exclusive power to
declare war.").
193. See H.R. Con. Res. 368, 107th Cong. (2002) (expressing the sense of Congress
that compulsory military service would be "violative of individual liberties protected by the
Constitution"); H.R. Con. Res. 49, 107th Cong. (2001) ("[T]reaty power of the President
does not extend beyond the enumerated powers of the Federal Government, but is limited by
the Constitution, and any exercise of such Executive power inconsistent with the
Constitution shall be of no legal force or effect.").
194. Relevance of Senate Ratification History to Treaty Interpretation, 11 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 28 (1987).
195. 134 CONG. REc. S6700-01 (1988) (on the treaty between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles).
196. Message to the Senate on the Soviet-United States Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Force Treaty, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 779, 780 (June 13, 1988).
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In sum, soft statutes will generally be a superior mechanism for expressing
legislative interpretations of the Constitution than committee hearings, floor
speeches, confirmation hearings, committee reports, hard statutes, or the failure
to enact hard statutes. Depending on one's view of judicial review, soft statutes
that express Congress's constitutional views might be dispositive or merely
evidentiary, but regardless they constitute a clear improvement over other
vehicles for constitutional interpretation in the legislature.
C. Constitutional Law of Soft Statutes
We have advocated greater use of soft statutes by Congress and greater
reliance on soft statues by courts. Are there potential constitutional obstacles to
elevating the role of soft statutes in the United States? In the past fifty years the
Supreme Court has often proved wary of legislative innovations, including the
legislative veto, 197 the line item veto, 198 and other policy-making regimes that
blur the boundaries between lawmaking and law implementing by the
legislative and executive branches. To the extent that soft statutes could be used
for some similar ends, does the Constitution impose a bar?
The most prominent constitutional requirement concerning soft statutes is
the murky doctrine surrounding the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause.
199
This clause, sometimes known as the Residual Presentment Clause, requires
that:
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote, to which the Concurrence of the Senate and
House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of
Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and
before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being
disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House
of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the
Case of a Bill.
200
The conventional wisdom about this provision is that it ensures Congress
cannot avoid the presentment requirement of Article I, Section 7, Clause 2,
simply by labeling a proposed law a "resolution" or enacting proposed
legislation as a "vote" rather than a "bill."20 1 Indeed, in the early Congresses,
197. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
198. Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
199. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. See generally Seth Barrett Tillman, A Textualist
Defense of Article 1, Section 7, Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v. Virginia Was Rightly
Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha Was Wrongly Reasoned, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1265 (2005)
(providing an exhaustive review of history and debate surrounding the Residual Presentment
Clause).
200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
201. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946-47 ("Presentment to the President and the
Presidential veto were considered so imperative that the draftsmen took special pains to
assure that these requirements could not be circumvented. During the final debate on Art. I, §
7, cl. 2, James Madison expressed concern that it might easily be evaded by the simple
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proposals were labeled "bills" and "resolutions" almost interchangeably.
Anticipating this practice, the clause was arguably intended to close a loophole
in the requirement for presentment. Although there has been some dissent from
this view, 20 2 the clause has not gamered sustained attention for several
decades. 203
On its face, the clause might be taken to require presentment for all orders,
votes, or resolutions, except relating to adjournment. Modem judicial
understanding is otherwise. Proposed constitutional amendments passed by
two-thirds majorities need not be presented to the President. 20 4 Early
congressional practice used concurrent resolutions and joint resolutions
interchangeably, but by the late 1800s, Congress sought to distinguish a class of
resolutions that must be presented to the President from the class that need not
be.205 In 1897, the Senate Judiciary Committee argued that a concurrent
resolution must be presented to the President only if it is "properly to be
regarded as legislative in its character and effect." 206 Views of the House were
largely the same. Only proposals that are legislative in purpose or effect must
be presented.2 °7 The practice of presenting all resolutions to the President has
been abandoned for more than a century, "apparently on the theory that the
expedient of calling a proposed law a 'resolution' or 'vote' rather than a 'bill.' As a
consequence, Art. I, § 7, cl. 3 .... was added.") (internal citations omitted); see also 2 MAX
FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 304-05 (1911):
Mr. Randolph, having thrown into a new form the motion, putting votes, Resolution &c.
on a footing with Bills, renewed it as follows. "Every order resolution or vote, to which the
concurrence of the Senate & House of Reps. may be necessary (except on a question of
adjournment and in the eases hereinafter mentioned) shall be presented to the President for
his revision; and before the same shall have force shall be approved by him, or being
disapproved by him shall be repassed by the Senate & House of Reps according to the rules
& limitations prescribed in the case of a Bill[.]"
Mr. Sherman thought it unnecessary, except as to votes taking money out of the Treasury
which might be provided for in another place.... The Amendment was made a Section 14[]
of Art VI.
See generally 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 388-89, 399, 404 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph
Lemer eds., 1987); Michael B. Rappaport, The President's Veto and the Constitution, 87
Nw. U. L. REV. 735, 753-55 (1993) (analyzing various interpretations of the Residual
Presentment Clause to argue against the constitutionality of the implicit selective veto).
202. Tillman, supra note 199.
203. See H. Lee Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the
Executive, 63 CAL. L. REV. 983, 1051, 1072-75 (1975) (discussing the clause's implications
for what he terms "extralegislative congressional action").
204. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
205. See Doyle W. Buckwalter, The Congressional Concurrent Resolution: A Search
for Foreign Policy Influence, 14 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 434,437 (1970).
206. S. REP. NO. 54-1335 (1897).
207. See Howard White, The Concurrent Resolution in Congress, 35 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 886 (1941).
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resolution is not a legislative act." 2° 8 This view was summarized by the
Supreme Court in Bowsher v. Synar.
209
A concurrent resolution, in contrast, makes no binding policy; it is "a
means of expressing fact, principles, opinions, and purposes of the two
Houses, ' 2 1° and thus does not need to be presented to the President. It is
settled, however, that if a resolution is intended to make policy that will bind
the nation and thus is "legislative in its character and effect," 21 1 then the full
Article I requirements must be observed. For "the nature or substance of the
resolution, and not its form, controls the question of its disposition."
2 12
As an aside, note that the Supreme Court's reliance on the 1897 Senate
Report as a source for its own judgment about constitutional meaning is further
evidence of the relevance of legislative views about the Constitution to the
courts. The case for giving weight to the report would be all the stronger had
the report been affirmatively voted on by both houses of Congress, resulting in
a soft statute interpreting the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause.
2 13
This clause has been interpreted to require presentment only for
"legislative acts," which are best taken to mean acts imposing binding legal
obligations. Because soft statues do not impose binding obligations, the clause
does not require presentment. Still, we have argued that soft statutes will often
induce behavioral changes. Perhaps any legislative pronouncement that
produces such effects should be deemed legislative and if it is, an "order, vote,
or resolution" must be presented to the President. This reading is textually
plausible, but it would be inconsistent with more than 100 years of actual
congressional practice and Supreme Court pronouncements on the matter.
Given that a presentment requirement would eliminate the advantages of soft
statutes, requiring presentment of all soft statutes seems an unwise deviation
from the existing doctrine.
Nor would relying on soft statutes run afoul of other limitations on
congressional powers. A straightforward argument is that congressional power
to rely on soft statutes for purposes of statutory or constitutional interpretation
is necessary and proper to the execution of other legislative powers. Having the
power to clarify the meaning of earlier hard statutes would allow Congress to
legislate at lower cost and with greater precision. 214 Indeed, if judges refuse to
208. 1A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 29:3 n.1 (6th
ed. 2000).
209. 478 U.S. 714, 755-56 (1986).
210. WILLIAM HOLMES BROWN, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL, AND RULES OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 176 (1991).
211. S. REP. No. 54-1335, at 8.
212. Id.
213. One concern here is self-dealing. Because the legislature is interpreting a
constitutional restriction on legislative behavior, the legislature might advance a self-serving
interpretation.
214. Cf Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115
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give weight to soft statutes in statutory interpretation (not constitutional
interpretation), the Constitution arguably permits Congress to pass a hard
215statute directing courts to do so. Others have proposed enacting a general
statute that specifies interpretive principles for judges to apply in statutory
interpretation. 216 A more modest proposal would direct or request that courts
give weight to soft statutes when interpreting another hard statute.
V. A GENERAL THEORY OF SOFT LAW
A. Law as Communication Generalized
We can now generalize our discussion of soft statutes and address soft law
more broadly. Consider an agent that has lawmaking powers. The agent could
be a legislature, a common law court, an administrative agency, a government
that participates in international lawmaking, or a similar entity. Authoritative
documents, such as written constitutions and unwritten customs, set the rules
that determine when the agent's communications are taken to be law and when
they are not taken to be law. When the agent complies with the rules, then other
agents-typically, those with executive power-will treat the communication
as law, and act in conformity with it. They will arrest people who break the
rules, or enforce civil damage judgments. The public will react accordingly.
When the lawmaking agent does not comply with the rules, its
communications will not be treated as law in the strong sense. Executive
officials will not arrest or otherwise sanction people whose behavior is
inconsistent with the policy judgment reflected in the communication.
However, the public (and other political agents) will often react as though the
communication were in fact law, as we have argued. The public might bring its
behavior into conformity with the policy goals expressed in the communication
because (for example) it predicts that later the lawmaking agent or some other
lawmaking agent will convert the communication into law, or because the
pronouncement is a focal point for behavior. As behavior changes, it may
become easier for the original lawmaking agent to enact a hard-law version of
the soft law, or for some other lawmaking agent (such as a court) to convert the
soft law into hard law.
A hypothesis follows from this analysis. All else equal, the relative
importance of soft law to hard law-at the risk of spurious precision, we might
say the ratio of soft law to hard law-will rise as the formalities for creating
hard law become stricter. This hypothesis explains the high soft law content of
HARV. L. REv. 2085, 2102-03 (2002) (arguing that a statute establishing federal rules of
statutory interpretation would accomplish similar ends).
215. Id. at 2086.
216. Id. at 2148-50.
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international law, where hard law requires the consent of all affected states; and
of the common law, where hard law can be generated only in response to a
justiciable dispute; and of constitutional law in the United States, where hard
law can be created only through the strict Article V process or in response to
justiciable disputes.
Hard law is easiest to create in the regulatory setting, where not much more
than notice and comment are required. Our topic-statutory law-is a middle
case. As we have seen, statute making faces significant formalities, with the
result that various soft law substitutes--concurrent resolutions, hortatory
statutes, signing statements-have emerged. One might also predict that soft
law will become popular in periods of uncertainty, where lawmaking agents
might seek to test the waters of public opinion before committing themselves to
a hard-law enactment.
In many cases, there is nothing troubling about soft law even though it has
real effects on people's behavior. One can think of it as a useful regulatory
instrument that allows governments to obtain policy goals without resorting to
law, which is sometimes too costly, crude, and inflexible. But in other cases,
resort to soft law may be troubling. Some people are better at perceiving soft
law than others; the latter group will often find themselves in a worse position
to control their lives. However, much of this argument turns on current
expectations about hard and soft law. If people come to expect that soft law
will function as a substitute for hard law, then they will endeavor to identify
soft public law in the same way they do hard public law. Soft statutes are
recorded alongside hard statutes; identifying the content of concurrent
resolutions is no easier or harder than identifying the content of hard
resolutions.
Some may be troubled by the way that soft law also plays havoc with the
separation of powers. It allows lawmaking institutions to avoid the participation
of other political institutions. We already discussed how soft statutes could
exclude the President from the lawmaking process. Although our view is that
the Constitution does not forbid the use of nonbinding legislative resolutions
without presentment to the President, if parties react to soft statutes, in some
circumstances the President's involvement could be reduced.
Similarly, the use of legislative soft law will often escape judicial review
when hard law will not. A sustained strategy of legislative soft law
pronouncements could exclude the judiciary from a role in the interpretive
process of lawmaking. Again, this is not obviously a problem. The benefit of
the soft statute is that it provides a clear indicator of legislative views without
the influence of the President's veto and without subsequent judicial
interpretation.
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B. Dicta
American judicial opinions contrast with those in many other countries,
where only a holding is stated, or sometimes a formulaic statement of the
reasoning that sheds no light on the real basis of the holding. American
opinions overflow with reasoning that has no legally binding effect-dicta. The
dictum is a type of soft law because it is a form of communication from a
lawmaking body (a court) that an audience will take as guidance because it
anticipates that future courts (as well as legislatures) may convert that soft law
into hard law. 
2 17
The advantages of dicta are well known. Litigants who know the reasons
for the holding as well as the holding itself can better predict how courts will
react in similar but not identical cases, and they can plan their behavior
accordingly. As in our example of Congress, courts can, in dicta, express their
general views without committing themselves to them. This may provide a
desirable balancing of two opposing virtues: settling the law so that people can
plan their behavior, and leaving the law open so that it can be determined on
the basis of better information as conditions change over time. Note how dicta
blur the traditional distinction between prospective (and binding) legislation
and retrospective (and binding) judicial interpretation: it is a form of
prospective but nonbinding legislation.
Judges, unlike legislators, do not have the option to issue "binding" dicta in
the form of prospective laws, though sometimes judges will purport to
summarize previous holdings as a binding rule of precedent. Nonetheless,
precedent is always vulnerable to narrowing as litigants persuade judges that
the reasons behind the precedent do not apply in their case. So dicta, if
skillfully employed, just seem like a useful way for judges to give hints about
the potential future path of the law-and this additional information will
always benefit the public (although it will benefit those who have sophisticated
legal advice more than those who do not).
There is, however, a danger from dicta, which our analysis brings clearly
into view. To the extent that the public adjusts its behavior in light of dicta, the
felt need for legislation over the relevant issue may diminish. That is to say,
judges can use dicta to legislate, impinging on the legislature's prerogatives. If
legislatures are generally better at legislating than courts are-and surely this is
usually the case, especially because dicta do not reflect facts before the court-
then dicta might crowd out good legislation. To be sure, if the public predicts a
legislative reaction, then it will not be as heavily influenced by dicta. How
these forces play out in any specific context is a difficult question. Virtually
everyone agrees that it is better to have a mix of binding precedent and
217. The distinction between dictum and holding is famously contested; in judicial
opinions, hard law blurs into soft law, and in virtually every case the boundaries are open to
debate.
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nonbinding dicta in judicial opinions.
C. Constitutional Law
At one time, one might have argued that hard constitutional law would
comprise only the original text and amendments issued under Article V.
However, it has long been clear that federal courts have the authority to
recognize new constitutional rights. Courts have hard-law authority to issue
binding interpretations of the U.S. Constitution when-and here is the main
formality-a justiciable dispute arises, and the Constitution develops as
precedents accumulate. 2 18 The formalities that distinguish hard constitutional
law and soft constitutional law are essentially those of justiciability. When
courts refuse to settle conflicting constitutional positions, and the Article V
hurdle is too high, soft law is the only mechanism for constitutional
development.
The modem soft-law analogue in constitutional development is thus the set
of constitutional rules and norms that have emerged outside the judicial and
Article V process. 2 19 Presidents make claims about executive power, embodied
in veto messages, signing statements, speeches, briefs, and messages to
Congress. 220 Congress makes opposing claims in resolutions, committee
reports, speeches, regular hard law, and other documents. Usually courts refrain
from resolving disputes between the President and Congress over the scope of
executive and legislative power, and so nonjudicial precedents ultimately
determine how these powers are allocated.
The enormous soft-law component of the separation of powers is likely due
to the courts' failure to intervene, plus the difficulty of amending the
Constitution. If the Constitution were easier to amend, it may be that
presidential powers would have been formally adjusted as circumstances
changed. Instead, the real constitutional allocation of authority is ambiguous,
contested, and perhaps unstable. The public can only make rough predictions
about whether the President's or Congress's views will prevail when conditions
force a decision and the President and Congress disagree about what to do. That
is when a constitutional crisis arises, and paralysis can ensue.
22 1
218. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U.
CHI. L. REv. 877 (1996).
219. See generally Young, supra note 1 (canvassing various materials, such as statutes,
executive materials, and legal practices outside of formal constitution, that regulate practice
in the way that formal constitutions do).
220. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 905, 907-11 (1990) (discussing settings in which the President may deviate from a
statute's requirements or judicial judgments because he disagrees about what the
Constitution requires); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of
Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REv. 1267, 1270-71, 1286-92 (1996) (offering
textual reading of the Constitution granting presidential power to interpret the Constitution).
221. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1.
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Still, whether we would be better off with a "harder" Constitution than the
one we have is a difficult question. As we have seen, the advantage of soft law
is that it is cheap to change, and so can be altered easily as conditions evolve.
What does seem to be clear is that courts and the public should pay attention to
the constitutional views of the executive branch and the legislature, and those
institutions should use the means at their disposal to make their views known.
In other constitutions, soft law has been institutionalized. For example, the
Indian Constitution establishes directive principles that "shall not be
enforceable by any court, but.., are nevertheless fundamental in the
governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these
principles in making laws." 222 These principles incorporate positive rights to
health care, a fair distribution of wealth, education, and so forth.22 3 Like other
forms of soft law, they are communications-here from the founders of the
modem Indian state-that express their vision of the overall ambition of that
state, one that could well have influenced the subsequent quasi-socialist path of
Indian development. Not surprisingly, the soft law has, to some extent,
hardened. The Supreme Court of India has drawn on the directive principles as
interpretive guidance, and these principles have thus made their way into
India's hard constitutional law.
224
D. International Law
International law has faced a similar problem. Under conventional
doctrine, states create international law mainly by entering treaties, which
require the consent of all treaty parties. This system works well enough when
two or a small number of states are involved. But many international problems
have global scope, and can be solved only if all or nearly all states participate.
Examples include the problem of maintaining peace, global environmental
problems such as climate change, human rights atrocities, and the depletion of
fisheries. States seeking to solve these problems cannot always persuade other
states to consent to an appropriate treaty regime, and so such a treaty regime
cannot come into existence.
The formality required to create international law--essentially, unanimous
consent-is far stricter than the formalities required to amend the U.S.
Constitution, and as a result international law is even harder to create. But just
as political agents in the United States work around the amendment rules by
creating soft constitutional law, so do states work around the international-law
rules by creating soft international law. States enter nonbinding agreements,
222. INDIA CONST. art. 37.
223. INDIA CONST. arts. 39-41.
224. See, e.g., Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 180 (holding that
municipal government must offer alternative dwellings to squatters evicted from public
property).
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hoping that they will help bring into existence a political consensus for binding
agreements, or that they will provide a framework for informal cooperation that
may later occur. Notable examples include the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the Basle Accords. The Universal Declaration set the stage for
subsequent hard-law treaties such as the International Covenant for Civil and
Political Rights, 22 5 while the Basle Accords, despite their soft-law status, led
directly to cooperation between the central banks of different states. 226 In
addition, states increasingly recognize a new type of customary international
law, which is not rigidly tied to state practice and hence clear evidence of state
consent. 22 7 Many scholars believe that states eventually come around and start
complying with this type of soft law, at which point it "hardens" into
conventional customary international law. 228 Others do not, and worry that
violation of soft-law norms will weaken incentives to comply with hard
international law. 229 In both the treaty and customary-international-law cases,
we see the international-law analogies to two of our public-law arguments: that
soft law can anticipate hard law and that soft law can directly change behavior
by supplying information about the goals of lawmakers.
The ubiquity of soft international law is also due to the absence of an
authoritative interpreter that takes care to distinguish communications that
comply with formalities and those that do not. States comply with soft law
when they have an interest in cooperating, just as they do for hard law.230 At
the other extreme, ordinary domestic legal regulation has greater hard-law
content; the reason is that the authority to create, interpret, and enforce
domestic law is more settled. Individuals take hard law seriously because they
expect that it will be enforced; soft law therefore has a residual role, mainly
that of providing information about the possible future path of hard law. In
between, constitutional law has substantial hard-law content where courts have
successfully asserted themselves as the authoritative interpreters of
constitutional law, and not where they have refrained from doing so-chiefly,
as we have noted, separation of powers and political questions. The executive
and legislative branches cooperate when they can, generating soft-law norms in
the process. Otherwise, they defer to the hard-law constitutional norms
generated by the courts or work around their conflicting legal positions.
225. MICHELINE R. ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 221-29 (2004).
226. See Ho, supra note 2.
227. For a discussion of this process, see Anthea Roberts, Traditional and Modern
Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757
(2001).
228. See COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 2.
229. See Jonathan I. Charney, Customary International Law in the Nicaragua Case
Judgment on the Merits, 1988 HAGUE Y.B. INT'L L. 16, 24; Weil, supra note 101, at 416-17.
230. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2.
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CONCLUSION
It is easy to dismiss soft law as inconsequential. When lawmaking
authorities create laws that by their own terms or common understanding have
no effect, one immediately suspects a cynical public-relations ploy. The
international lawyer Hersch Lauterpacht said that states agreed to the terms of
the Universal Declaration only because they would not be bound by them. 2 31
As we saw above, critics of hortatory laws assume that they are designed to
mislead the public, so that Congress wins credit without having to raise taxes or
regulate powerful interest groups. 2 32 Yet no one makes the similar claim about
the private-law analogue-nonenforceable letters of intent that set the stage for
negotiations that will culminate in a binding agreement, or nonenforceable
contracts that provide a basis for cooperation but no appeal to the courts. Soft
public law has similar desirable properties, as we have shown.
Agents may demand soft law because the formalities for creating hard law
are strict, and so prevent legislation that the agents seek. Sometimes, soft law
provides a second-best solution: agents would prefer hard law but can only
obtain soft law, which allows for some cooperation but less than hard law
would. But soft law can also be a first-best way of affecting behavior. Soft law
avoids unwanted consequences of the use of hard law, such as the involvement
of other agents (for example, judges or the President). In the domestic context,
political agents who use soft law might fear that judges do not understand their
interests and the nature of their cooperation; or they might fear that judges will
protect interests that they wish to ignore. In either case, from the perspective of
the political agents, soft law is not a second-best, but is simply an alternative
regulatory instrument that has advantages that formal legislation lacks.
We have provided theoretical reasons for believing that soft statutes affect
behavior, and some anecdotal evidence. We have identified several categories
of behavior where soft statutes are likely to be important: where expression of
the sense of Congress can help parties adjust to future hard legislation; can
provide an independent basis of cooperation by revealing Congress's view of
the world; and can enable Congress to stake out its congressional authority vis-
A-vis the President and other constitutional agents when the judiciary declines
to intervene. These activities have implications for statutory interpretation and
constitutional adjudication, though precisely how courts should take account of
soft statutes depends on contested theories of statutory interpretation and
constitutional development.
We have only scratched the surface of a difficult topic, and we conclude by
identifying subjects for further research. One question concerns the conditions
under which soft law becomes hard law. In international law, a general view is
231. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 397-98 (1950).
For other criticisms of international soft law, see Weil, supra note 101, at 416-17.
232. See supra Part II.C.2.
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that soft law tends to harden: states eventually incorporate it in treaties or it
enters customary international law. The Universal Declaration illustrates both
these paths. In domestic constitutional law, this sometimes happens-when the
Supreme Court recognizes a political norm as a constitutional norm, for
example, the 1897 Senate's understanding of the Orders, Votes, and
Resolutions Clause that was ultimately approved by the Supreme Court. 2 3 3 But
soft law often seems to exist in parallel (and in tension) with hard law. People
who do not like soft constitutional norms appeal back to the written
Constitution. International lawyers fear that soft international law will weaken
the legitimacy of hard international law. 
234
Another question concerns whether hard law might crowd out soft law, in a
harmful (or beneficial) way. In the social-norms literature, this possibility is a
recurrent theme. Scholars often argue that legal norms might injure social
norms without fully replacing them, so that people find it harder to cooperate
despite well-intended legal intervention. 23  In the legislative and agency
context, the concern seems to be the opposite-that congressional resolutions
or agency guidance statements might crowd out formal legislation and
regulation, because they are easier to enact. In the agency context, critics worry
that the informal approach reduces public input and inappropriately lowers the
costs of agency action. In the legislative context, one might worry that
Congress can use soft law to obtain ends that would otherwise contravene
constitutional limits.
233. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 755-56 (1986).
234. See Charney, supra note 229, at 24.
235. See POSNER, supra note 14, at 219-22.
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